Who uses what for email DAILY

Mailbox providers and ESPs across the Tranco top-1M — snapshot of 2026-03-01.

683 543
Domains with MX
639 798
Domains with SPF
454 475
Domains with DMARC
683 543
Total scanned

What you're looking at. Four headline counts for the analysed Tranco snapshot: how many domains publish each kind of email-related DNS record. Higher MX vs SPF gap = more domains receive mail than authorise sending; higher SPF vs DMARC gap = SPF adopted but no policy/feedback enforcement yet.

KPIs — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

Domains with MX
660 822
-12 450
vs 2026-04-26
Domains with SPF
624 507
-7 597
vs 2026-04-26
Domains with DMARC
452 092
-4 906
vs 2026-04-26

Top mailbox providers

What this block shows. Where each domain hosts incoming mail — derived from its primary MX record (lowest mx_preference). This is the receiving side of email: Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho, on-prem Exchange, etc. "Generic / unmatched" buckets are common mail.* / mx*.* hostnames we couldn't attribute to a specific provider; "Unknown / Other" is everything else.

#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
1Unknown / Other176 09525.76%
2Google Workspace147 22421.54%
3Microsoft 365113 14416.55%
4Generic / unmatched (mail.*)94 30513.8%
5Generic / unmatched (mx*.*)62 7169.18%
6Yandex 36012 5241.83%
7Mimecast10 1501.48%
8Generic / unmatched (smtp.*)7 8361.15%
9Zoho Mail6 8951.01%
10Amazon WorkMail4 9040.72%
Show rows 11 – 30
#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
11OVH Mail4 7550.7%
12QQ Mail (Tencent)4 7370.69%
13Mail.ru for Business4 2000.61%
141&1 IONOS3 2860.48%
15Cisco IronPort2 9690.43%
16Rackspace Email2 6150.38%
17Mailgun (inbound)2 3410.34%
18Beget (RU)2 2820.33%
19Alibaba Mail (China)1 7910.26%
20Zoho Mail (EU)1 7310.25%
21Hosted Email (Rackspace/IONOS)1 6730.24%
22FastMail1 6120.24%
23ProtonMail1 5880.23%
24Gandi Mail1 5200.22%
25Timeweb (RU)1 3540.2%
26NetEase Mail1 3110.19%
27Titan (Hostinger)1 1920.17%
28Zoho Mail (IN)1 0210.15%
29CSC (corporate)9950.15%
30Reg.ru8030.12%

Top mailbox providers (share of MX) — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

Unknown / Other
25.56%
-0.49%
vs 2026-04-26
Google Workspace
21.69%
+0.18%
vs 2026-04-26
Microsoft 365
16.78%
+0.17%
vs 2026-04-26
Generic / unmatched (mail.*)
13.49%
+0.08%
vs 2026-04-26
Generic / unmatched (mx*.*)
9.16%
-0.06%
vs 2026-04-26

Top ESPs / mass-mailing services

What this block shows. Outbound mass-mailing platforms each domain authorises in its SPF record — the marketing-automation, transactional-email and customer-engagement layer (SendGrid, Mailchimp, Mailgun, Klaviyo, HubSpot, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, etc.). One domain can use several ESPs, so percentages sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains.

#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Amazon SES37 8565.92%
2SendGrid (Twilio)29 9994.69%
3Mailgun25 7584.03%
4Zendesk24 5373.84%
5Mailchimp24 2983.8%
6Mandrill22 4043.5%
7Salesforce16 1822.53%
8Mailjet (Sinch)13 4912.11%
9Brevo (ex-Sendinblue)7 1041.11%
10Elastic Email4 5440.71%
Show rows 11 – 30
#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Unisender (RU)3 9760.62%
12Marketo (Adobe)3 4910.55%
13Postmark2 8510.45%
14SparkPost2 7460.43%
15Constant Contact1 8800.29%
16MailerSend1 8390.29%
17Salesforce Marketing Cloud1 7790.28%
18Freshdesk1 5970.25%
19SMTP.com1 2540.2%
20SMTP.BZ7320.11%
21Sailthru6480.1%
22GetResponse6170.1%
23Customer.io4860.08%
24Eloqua (Oracle)2850.04%
25HubSpot470.01%
26Intercom360.01%
27Klaviyo310.0%
28MailPoet90.0%
29Omnisend60.0%
30Dotdigital50.0%

Top ESPs (share of SPF) — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

Amazon SES
6.09%
+0.03%
vs 2026-04-26
SendGrid (Twilio)
4.78%
+0.03%
vs 2026-04-26
Mailgun
4.05%
+0.02%
vs 2026-04-26
Zendesk
3.85%
+0.03%
vs 2026-04-26
Mailchimp
3.74%
+0.03%
vs 2026-04-26

SaaS senders (Notion, Slack, Zendesk, Atlassian, Stripe…)

What this block shows. SaaS apps that send mail FROM a customer's domain on the customer's behalf — productivity, support, payments, HR, e-commerce and other business apps appearing as include: targets in the customer's SPF. Distinct from ESPs (mass-mailing platforms) and mailbox providers (where the inbox lives).

#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Pardot (Salesforce)5 3530.84%
2Shopify5 1590.81%
3KnowBe43 5220.55%
4Trustpilot1 9670.31%
5Atlassian (Jira/Confluence)1 9390.3%
6Firebase (Google)1 7380.27%
7Lark / Feishu1 2540.2%
8BigCommerce1 2030.19%
9NetSuite (Oracle)1 1700.18%
10Qualtrics1 1660.18%
Show rows 11 – 30
#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Sage Intacct1 0870.17%
12Oracle Cloud Email1 0610.17%
13Docebo (LMS)9520.15%
14WordPress.com / WP Cloud9050.14%
15Oracle Cloud8270.13%
16Greenhouse6610.1%
17PayPal Braintree6390.1%
18ClickDimensions6290.1%
19Autotask (ConnectWise)5660.09%
20ConnectWise5630.09%
21UKG / UltiPro5330.08%
22Zendesk4520.07%
23HappyFox4320.07%
24FormAssembly4260.07%
25Shoptet4100.06%
26Odoo3940.06%
27Chargebee3390.05%
28Freshsales (Freshworks)2100.03%
29Gorgias1590.02%
30Squarespace1310.02%

Top SaaS senders (share of SPF) — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

Pardot (Salesforce)
0.82%
+0.01%
vs 2026-04-26
Shopify
0.80%
±0%
vs 2026-04-26
KnowBe4
0.56%
+0.01%
vs 2026-04-26
Trustpilot
0.31%
±0%
vs 2026-04-26
Atlassian (Jira/Confluence)
0.31%
+0.01%
vs 2026-04-26

DMARC adoption

What this block shows. The policy each DMARC-publishing domain advertises at _dmarc.<domain>: none = monitor only, quarantine = mark as spam on fail, reject = drop on fail, invalid = a syntactically broken record. "Enforced %" treats only quarantine / reject with pct=100 as actually enforcing.

DMARC enforced — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

DMARC enforced %
47.01%
+0.23%
vs 2026-04-26

DMARC policies — Today 2026-04-27 vs 2026-04-26

p=invalid
198
-4
vs 2026-04-26
p=none
231 376
-3 659
vs 2026-04-26
p=quarantine
112 474
-874
vs 2026-04-26
p=reject
112 948
-475
vs 2026-04-26

Top 100 most-used DMARC records (verbatim)

The literal record string copied verbatim from DNS — useful to spot copy-pasted "starter" policies and identify reporting endpoints (the rua= / ruf= tags) shared across many domains.

#DMARC recordDomains
1v=DMARC1; p=none;55 656
2v=DMARC1; p=none33 560
3v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com7 880
4v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;4 625
5v=DMARC1;p=none;4 103
6v=DMARC1; p=quarantine3 899
7v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s3 885
8v=DMARC1; p=reject;3 567
9v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com3 460
10v=DMARC1; p=reject2 849
11v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r;2 472
12v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;2 444
13v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; ruf=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=864002 345
14v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=1002 344
15v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; sp=none1 815
16v=DMARC1;p=none1 806
17v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;1 753
18v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r;1 509
19v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=11 425
20v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 414
21v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=864001 288
22v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;1 281
23v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 231
24v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;1 167
25v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;1 150
Show rows 26 – 100
#DMARC recordDomains
26v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;1 115
27v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com1 093
28v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none1 070
29v=DMARC1;p=reject;1 064
30v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email754
31v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s730
32v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100729
33v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100720
34v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400637
35v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com620
36v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400613
37v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com; ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com602
38v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com588
39v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com577
40v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:xlcat@rua.agari.com,mailto:ewai10d2@ag.eu.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:xlcat@ruf.agari.com523
41v=DMARC1;p=quarantine513
42v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;500
43v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@qq.com488
44v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100;472
45v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s458
46v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100;449
47v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;447
48v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; fo=1394
49v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; adkim=r; aspf=r390
50v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;389
51v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100;364
52v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1361
53v=DMARC1;p=reject356
54v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;354
55v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r353
56v=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com351
57v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400351
58v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; ruf=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; rf=afrf; pct=100335
59v=DMARC1329
60v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zsrbf6su@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com;328
61v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com; ruf=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com;312
62v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:2ynhg3yt@ag.dmarcian.com292
63v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;282
64v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400271
65v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;fo=1270
66v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r269
67v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com269
68v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s261
69v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;260
70v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:dmarc_report@service.aliyun.com252
71v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r250
72v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100241
73v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com238
74v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;pct=50;adkim=r;aspf=r;236
75v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua-mpse@mpub.ne.jp236
76v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:d@rua.agari.com; ruf=mailto:d@ruf.agari.com230
77v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com227
78v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zicaptxt@ag.dmarcian.com;217
79v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s;216
80v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@fbl.optin.com;206
81v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com200
82v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100200
83v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-raports@dhosting.pl195
84v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;aspf=r;adkim=r;190
85v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject183
86v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@reporting.unisender.com183
87v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;176
88v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@ag.eu.dmarcly.com; ruf=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@fo.eu.dmarcly.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1;176
89v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;174
90v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400172
91v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s169
92v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc.rua@edrone.app; ruf=mailto:dmarc.ruf@edrone.app167
93v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=none; pct=100; ri=86400166
94v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; adkim=r; aspf=r;163
95v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1162
96v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com158
97v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:a@dmarcreports.facebook.com;157
98v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400156
99v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100156
100v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=50;156

Unmatched MX targets — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular MX hostnames our dictionary does not yet attribute to a named mailbox provider. Public list — these feed back into dictionaries/mx_providers.py for the next iteration so coverage keeps improving.

#MX targetDomains
1route1.mx.cloudflare.net8 616
2route3.mx.cloudflare.net8 614
3route2.mx.cloudflare.net8 614
4eforward5.registrar-servers.com7 436
5eforward1.registrar-servers.com7 430
6eforward2.registrar-servers.com7 427
7eforward4.registrar-servers.com7 427
8eforward3.registrar-servers.com7 417
9mx1.hostinger.com5 995
10mx2.hostinger.com5 970
11mailstore1.secureserver.net5 194
12smtp.secureserver.net5 181
13nan2 697
14mx3-hosting.jellyfish.systems2 641
15mx2-hosting.jellyfish.systems2 639
16mx1-hosting.jellyfish.systems2 624
17mx1-us1.ppe-hosted.com2 148
18mx2-us1.ppe-hosted.com2 134
19mx10.antispam.mailspamprotection.com1 769
20mx20.antispam.mailspamprotection.com1 768
21mx30.antispam.mailspamprotection.com1 764
22mx1.privateemail.com1 749
23mx2.privateemail.com1 734
24park-mx.above.com1 152
25mx01.hornetsecurity.com1 104
Show rows 26 – 100
#MX targetDomains
26mx02.hornetsecurity.com1 101
27mx.stackmail.com1 079
28mx03.hornetsecurity.com1 075
29mx1.mailchannels.net1 071
30mx04.hornetsecurity.com1 067
31mx2.mailchannels.net1 067
32mx156.hostedmxserver.com991
33isaac.mx.cloudflare.net947
34amir.mx.cloudflare.net945
35linda.mx.cloudflare.net945
36mx.a.locaweb.com.br923
37mx.b.locaweb.com.br911
38mx.jk.locaweb.com.br909
39mx1.qiye.aliyun.com853
40mx2.qiye.aliyun.com838
41mx3.qiye.aliyun.com824
42mx.core.locaweb.com.br823
43smtpin.rzone.de791
44mx1.hostinger.in760
45mx.spamexperts.com753
46mx2.hostinger.in751
47fallbackmx.spamexperts.eu738
48mx2.feishu.cn734
49mx1.feishu.cn732
50mx3.feishu.cn731
51lastmx.spamexperts.net728
52us2.mx3.mailhostbox.com703
53us2.mx1.mailhostbox.com702
54us2.mx2.mailhostbox.com700
55mx1.csof.net688
56mx2.csof.net688
57mta-gw.infomaniak.ch684
58mx.plingest.com637
59dmail.kagoya.net594
60mx.securemx.jp592
61za-smtp-inbound-1.mimecast.co.za581
62za-smtp-inbound-2.mimecast.co.za580
63mxlb.ispgateway.de566
64mx20.mailspamprotection.com558
65mx10.mailspamprotection.com556
66mx30.mailspamprotection.com548
67mx01.nicmail.ru520
68mx02.nicmail.ru510
69mx1.forwardemail.net510
70mx03.nicmail.ru508
71mx20.ukraine.com.ua506
72mx2.forwardemail.net506
73mx15.ukraine.com.ua504
74mail.register.it479
75mailstream-east.mxrecord.io422
76mailstream-west.mxrecord.io422
77mx.ukraine.com.ua416
78mailstream-central.mxrecord.mx408
79mx002.netsol.xion.oxcs.net399
80mx001.netsol.xion.oxcs.net398
81mx01.lolipop.jp386
82mx1-eu1.ppe-hosted.com386
83mx1.larksuite.com381
84mx2.larksuite.com381
85mx2-eu1.ppe-hosted.com381
86mx3.larksuite.com379
87mx.serviciodecorreo.es375
88mx.mgovcloud.in341
89mx2.mgovcloud.in340
90mx3.mgovcloud.in339
91mxext1.mailbox.org338
92mxext2.mailbox.org335
93mx-biz.mail.am0.yahoodns.net329
94in.arubabusiness.it328
95mxext3.mailbox.org328
96mx-01-eu-central-1.prod.hydra.sophos.com322
97localhost319
98mx01.udag.de316
99mx-02-eu-central-1.prod.hydra.sophos.com315
100mx00.udag.de314

Unmatched SPF includes — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular SPF include: targets that don't match any known ESP, mailbox-as-sender, or SaaS pattern yet. Same feedback loop: top hits get added to dictionaries/esps.py or dictionaries/saas_senders.py.

#SPF includeDomains
1_spf.mx.cloudflare.net10 010
2secureserver.net8 649
3spf.efwd.registrar-servers.com7 617
4_spf.mail.hostinger.com7 496
5relay.mailchannels.net6 944
6_spf.mlsend.com6 377
7zoho.com5 364
8mx.ovh.com5 262
9websitewelcome.com4 213
10us._netblocks.mimecast.com3 733
11emsd1.com3 246
12spf.web-hosting.com3 128
13emailsrvr.com3 043
14spf.mail.qq.com2 984
15_spf.createsend.com2 862
16_spf-eu.ionos.com2 612
17beget.com2 499
18mxsspf.sendpulse.com2 493
19helpscoutemail.com2 481
20zcsend.net2 423
21spf.sender.xserver.jp2 249
22stspg-customer.com2 197
23eu._netblocks.mimecast.com2 146
24spf.ess.barracudanetworks.com2 133
25zohomail.com1 965
Show rows 26 – 100
#SPF includeDomains
26spf.brevo.com1 847
27transmail.net1 803
28_spf.rdstation.com.br1 776
29spf.messagingengine.com1 663
30spf.emailsignatures365.com1 626
31spf.crsend.com1 620
32spf.mxhichina.com1 530
33musvc.com1 504
34spf.163.com1 474
35_spf.timeweb.ru1 457
36spf.antispamcloud.com1 380
37_mailcust.gandi.net1 360
38_spf.hostedemail.com1 336
39spf.titan.email1 335
40_incspfcheck.mailspike.net1 332
41spf.hornetsecurity.com1 329
42_netblocks.mimecast.com1 326
43relay.mailbaby.net1 310
44netblocks.dreamhost.com1 287
45aspmx.googlemail.com1 242
46spf.mysecurecloudhost.com1 240
47one.zoho.com1 234
48spf.exclaimer.net1 224
49spfa.cpmails.com1 220
50spf.tmes.trendmicro.com1 181
51_spf.kundenserver.de1 170
52_spf.aruba.it1 120
53spf.messagelabs.com1 110
54spf.stackmail.com1 104
55spf.smtp2go.com1 091
56_spf.locaweb.com.br1 090
57_spf.perfora.net1 086
58spf2.esputnik.com1 066
59_spf.jupiter.salesmanago.pl1 057
60outboundmail.blackbaud.net1 052
61spf.qiye.aliyun.com1 012
62spf.securedserverspace.com1 011
63authsmtp.com993
64spf-de.emailsignatures365.com976
65_spf.hosting.reg.ru976
66spf.ipzmarketing.com965
67_spf.ukraine.com.ua935
68spf.dynect.net918
69spf-bma.mpme.jp906
70ispgateway.de899
71zoho.in889
72_spf.emaillabs.net.pl880
73spfa.mailendo.com876
74spf.infomaniak.ch825
75spf.eu.exclaimer.net823
76_spf.mailhostbox.com816
77_spf.mailspamprotection.com779
78mxsmtp.sendpulse.com771
79agenturserver.de765
80de._netblocks.mimecast.com763
81eu.zcsend.net752
82kagoya.net739
83_spf.dashasender.ru731
84usb._netblocks.mimecast.com731
85_spf.kmitd.com713
86spf.improvmx.com702
87cmail1.com691
88spf.afas.online684
89spf.webapps.net675
90sendersrv.com675
91eu.transmail.net674
92_spf-us.ionos.com673
93spf.bmv.jp666
94zohomail.eu664
95spf.flowmailer.net661
96spf.unisender.ru656
97spf.mindbox.ru649
98spf.sendsay.ru647
99turbo-smtp.com634
100spf.nl2go.com633

Methodology — how the numbers were produced

1. Data source

The dataset is the daily OpenINTEL forward-DNS Tranco snapshot, produced by the OpenINTEL project (University of Twente / SURFnet / SIDN Labs). OpenINTEL queries the entire Tranco top-1M domain list (https://tranco-list.eu/) daily for MX, TXT, NS, A, AAAA, SOA, CAA, DNSSEC and other records, publishing the results as Apache Parquet.

Cite: Roland van Rijswijk-Deij et al., "A High-Performance, Scalable Infrastructure for Large-Scale Active DNS Measurements", IEEE JSAC 2016.

2. Sample

We process the snapshot for a single date (the latest available, typically <24h delay) covering the entire Tranco top-1M list. No sub-sampling; every domain queried by OpenINTEL is included.

3. Mailbox provider classification

For each domain we read its MX RRset and pick the record with the lowest mx_preference as the primary mailbox host. The hostname of that primary MX is matched against an open regex dictionary (dictionaries/mx_providers.py). Specific patterns (e.g. .mail.protection.outlook.com) are tried first; generic fallbacks (mail.*, mx*.*) only after. Domains whose MX matches no rule are kept as "Unknown / Other" — never dropped — and exported in Unmatched MX targets below for dictionary improvement.

4. ESP (mass-mailing service) classification

For each domain's apex SPF record (TXT starting with v=spf1) we extract every include: and redirect= target and resolve them against an open dictionary (dictionaries/esps.py). One domain may use several ESPs simultaneously (e.g. SendGrid + Mailchimp), so ESP shares sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains.

Note: this method does not count "flattened" SPF (where include chains were replaced with raw IPs to fit the 10-lookup limit) — those domains will appear as ESP-less even when an ESP is in fact used. This is a known limitation of any DNS-only methodology and is consistent across competitive surveys.

5. DMARC

For each domain we query the _dmarc.<domain> TXT record. Records starting with v=DMARC1 are parsed for p= (policy) and pct= (percentage covered). A domain is counted as enforced if p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100 (or pct absent, which defaults to 100).

6. Tier breakdown

Each domain is assigned a tier from its Tranco rank: top-1k, top-10k, top-100k, top-1M, or unranked if absent from the list at scan time.

7. Reproducibility

Every published report includes the exact OpenINTEL date, dictionary hashes, and counts of unmatched MX hosts and SPF includes — so any reader can verify or reproduce the figures. Raw OpenINTEL parquet is downloaded into a temporary cache and deleted after analysis; only aggregated, non-redistributable counts are kept here (per OpenINTEL data agreement).

8. Limitations to be aware of

  • Tranco bias. Top-1M skews toward US/EU and global SaaS; ccTLD-only domains with low traffic may be under-represented.
  • SPF flattening hides ESP identity (see §4).
  • CNAME chains on MX (e.g. mail.example.com → mail.example.protection.outlook.com) are not unrolled — only the first MX target is matched. This biases a small share of domains toward "Unknown" when their MX is a CNAME to a known provider.
  • Vanity MX with white-label provider (e.g. some Mimecast/Proofpoint customers use their own brand) is not detectable from DNS alone.

Comments & corrections

Spotted a mis-classified MX target, missed ESP, or want to discuss a finding? We publish corrections in the next daily snapshot.

Send feedback to support@live-direct-marketing.online

Inline comments coming soon. For now, email is the fastest path — you'll see your fix reflected in tomorrow's run.

Historical reports

Daily snapshots — last 90 days kept fully, older ones thinned to monthly.

Data source: https://openintel.nl/data/forward-dns/top-lists/
Generated automatically from OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot 2026-03-01. Aggregates only — raw OpenINTEL data is deleted after analysis per their data agreement.
Last build: 2026-04-28T11:02:32Z.