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Inbox Placement Test
by Live Direct Marketing
676 554
Domains with MX
642 190
Domains with SPF
479 978
Domains with DMARC
47.14%
DMARC enforced

What you're looking at. Headline numbers for the analysed Tranco snapshot: how many domains publish each kind of email-related DNS record, and what share of DMARC publishers actually enforce their policy (quarantine/reject). Higher MX vs SPF gap = more domains receive mail than authorise sending; higher SPF vs DMARC gap = SPF adopted but no policy/feedback enforcement yet.

Key findings — 2026-09-04

Each statement is recomputed daily from the full dataset and published under CC BY 4.0 — reuse it, cite "Live Direct Marketing, Email infrastructure of the Tranco top-1M" with a link. Machine-readable version: api/latest.json · llms.txt. Looking for one domain? Domain lookup — mailbox provider, ESPs and DMARC policy of any top-10k website.

Classification coverage — what the dictionaries explain

65.94%
MX attributed to a vendor
11.34%
MX unresolved / generic
82.56%
SPF include targets classified
81 967
Unique unknown SPF targets

Coverage is recomputed from every snapshot. MX vendor attribution excludes self-hosted domains (22.72%); SPF coverage counts each distinct include:/redirect= target once per domain. Fully classified SPF stacks: 72.38% of domains that delegate through at least one include.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · KPIs

Top mailbox providers

What this block shows. Where each domain hosts incoming mail — derived from its primary MX record (lowest mx_preference). This is the receiving side of email: Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho, on-prem Exchange, etc. "Generic / unmatched" buckets are common mail.* / mx*.* hostnames we couldn't attribute to a specific provider; "Unknown / Other" is everything else. Note: Cloudflare Email Routing also appears in the ESP table below — that is the same service observed through two different record types (MX here, SPF there), not a double count of domains.

#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
1Self-Hosted →153 72322.72%
2Google Workspace →146 06121.59%
3Microsoft 365 →113 58116.79%
4Unknown / Other →46 1956.83%
5Generic / unmatched (mx*.*) →17 4312.58%
6Proofpoint →12 7051.88%
7Generic / unmatched (mail.*) →12 0411.78%
8Cloudflare Email Routing →11 5581.71%
9Yandex 360 →10 8931.61%
10Mimecast →9 8401.45%
Show rows 11 – 30
#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
11Hostinger →8 8431.31%
12Namecheap Email Forwarding →7 5321.11%
13Zoho Mail →7 0241.04%
14QQ Mail (Tencent) →5 4180.80%
15GoDaddy →5 3200.79%
16OVH Mail →5 1670.76%
17Amazon WorkMail →4 5620.67%
181&1 IONOS →4 5480.67%
19Mail.ru for Business →3 5510.52%
20Barracuda →3 4250.51%
21Proofpoint Essentials →2 9800.44%
22Jellyfish (Namecheap) →2 9250.43%
23SpamExperts (SolarWinds) →2 6660.39%
24Beget (RU) →2 5820.38%
25Cisco IronPort →2 5410.38%
26Rackspace Email →2 2110.33%
27Mailgun (inbound) →2 1440.32%
28Alibaba Mail (China) →1 9740.29%
29Zoho Mail (EU) →1 9340.29%
30Hosted Email (Rackspace/IONOS) →1 8640.28%
🏠 Open Providers portfolio → cards with country, blurb, sparkline & TLD breakdown — click any provider name above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top mailbox providers

Long-tail / Unknown MX — the rest of the internet

What this block shows. The slice of domains whose mailbox cannot be attributed to a named provider — regional hosters, self-built Postfix/Exim, corporate gateways, niche ESPs. Researchers ask for this specifically because it captures the deliverability reality outside the Google / Microsoft monoculture. The detailed report drills down into Top-1000 most common unmatched hosts, 100 hand-picked curiosities (longest one-off names) and a TLD breakdown.

Unknown / Generic share
11.34%
76 703 domains
Unique unmatched MX hosts
37 172
individual hostnames in the long tail
Self-hosted
22.72%
153 723 domains running their own MX
📋 Open detailed long-tail report →·⬇ Download top-1000 unmatched MX (CSV)·⬇ Download 100 curiosities (CSV)

Authentication by Tranco tier

The same metrics cut by list position. Enforcement is a function of how big the site is: the gradient from the top of the list to the tail is the finding, not the average. "Not in current list" = domains measured in this snapshot that are absent from today's Tranco file (list rotation).

#TierDomains with MXSPFDMARC enforcedSelf-hosted
1Tranco top-1k69394.08%73.30%12.41%
2top-1k … 10k6 50492.94%56.87%14.88%
3top-10k … 100k64 36591.18%43.25%17.66%
4top-100k … 1M586 46989.65%28.13%23.18%
5not in current list18 52388.86%22.36%28.88%

Top ESPs / mass-mailing services

What this block shows. Outbound mass-mailing platforms each domain authorises in its SPF record — the marketing-automation, transactional-email and customer-engagement layer (SendGrid, Mailchimp, Mailgun, Klaviyo, HubSpot, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, etc.). One domain can use several ESPs, so percentages sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains.

#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Amazon SES →39 1086.09%
2SendGrid (Twilio) →29 5114.60%
3Mailgun →25 5643.98%
4Zendesk →23 8713.72%
5Mailchimp →22 8763.56%
6Mandrill →20 7043.22%
7HubSpot →19 7463.07%
8Salesforce →16 1632.52%
9Mailjet (Sinch) →13 5172.10%
10Cloudflare Email Routing →12 1561.89%
Show rows 11 – 30
#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Brevo (ex-Sendinblue) →9 3501.46%
12Mimecast →8 5931.34%
13MailerSend →8 2611.29%
14Namecheap Forwarding →7 8021.21%
15MailChannels →6 6621.04%
16Proofpoint →5 9070.92%
17Elastic Email →4 5170.70%
18Unisender (RU) →3 7160.58%
19Constant Contact →3 6320.57%
20Campaign Monitor →3 5500.55%
21Zoho Campaigns →3 2300.50%
22Marketo (Adobe) →3 2080.50%
23Postmark →2 9510.46%
24Emsd1 (transactional) →2 9190.45%
25SendPulse →2 8890.45%
26Exclaimer (signatures) →2 6830.42%
27SparkPost →2 6540.41%
28Zoho ZeptoMail →2 5910.40%
29Help Scout →2 2380.35%
30Salesforce Marketing Cloud →2 1800.34%
📮 Open Mailing services portfolio → all detected ESPs with descriptions, country, sparklines — click any ESP above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top ESPs

SaaS senders (Notion, Slack, Zendesk, Atlassian, Stripe…)

What this block shows. SaaS apps that send mail FROM a customer's domain on the customer's behalf — productivity, support, payments, HR, e-commerce and other business apps appearing as include: targets in the customer's SPF. Distinct from ESPs (mass-mailing platforms) and mailbox providers (where the inbox lives).

#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Shopify →5 5490.86%
2Pardot (Salesforce) →4 7500.74%
3CodeTwo Email Signatures 365 →4 5020.70%
4KnowBe4 →3 4070.53%
5Statuspage (Atlassian) →2 0330.32%
6BigCommerce →1 8940.29%
7Trustpilot →1 8830.29%
8Firebase (Google) →1 8440.29%
9Atlassian (Jira/Confluence) →1 7710.28%
10Lark / Feishu →1 2920.20%
Show rows 11 – 30
#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Sage Intacct →1 1350.18%
12NetSuite (Oracle) →1 1340.18%
13Oracle Cloud Email →1 0960.17%
14Qualtrics →1 0920.17%
15WordPress.com / WP Cloud →1 0150.16%
16SAP SuccessFactors →9510.15%
17Docebo (LMS) →9240.14%
18Oracle Cloud →8310.13%
19One.com (DK hosting) →8300.13%
20Zoho Books →7200.11%
21AFAS →6650.10%
22Greenhouse →6190.10%
23PayPal Braintree →5610.09%
24ClickDimensions →5560.09%
25UKG / UltiPro →5170.08%
26Autotask (ConnectWise) →4690.07%
27Odoo →4480.07%
28FormAssembly →4470.07%
29TOPdesk →4450.07%
30k.io (workspace) →4320.07%
📧 Open SaaS/ESP senders portfolio → SaaS apps sending FROM customer domains — click any SaaS name above for detail

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top SaaS senders

DMARC adoption

What this block shows. The policy each DMARC-publishing domain advertises at _dmarc.<domain>: none = monitor only, quarantine = mark as spam on fail, reject = drop on fail, invalid = a syntactically broken record. "Enforced %" treats only quarantine / reject with pct=100 as actually enforcing.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC enforced %

7d ago▼ -0.22%30d ago▼ -0.25%

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC policies

Does the DMARC record actually do anything?

A three-way split instead of the usual enforced/not-enforced binary. Enforcing — p=quarantine or p=reject. Monitoring — p=none with a working rua= address: a legitimate rollout phase, someone is reading the reports. Inert — p=none with no reporting address at all: the record enforces nothing and reports nowhere.

35.74%
DMARC without reporting address
171 551 domains publish DMARC but receive no aggregate reports
25.28%
Inert records (p=none, no rua)
121 326 domains — the record does nothing at all
36.42%
Reports go to an external vendor only
174 801 domains send every report off-domain

Maturity split of 479 978 DMARC-publishing domains: 49.40% enforcing, 25.28% monitoring, 25.28% inert. Under DMARCbis (RFC 9989/9990/9991) the pct= tag no longer exists, so the same snapshot yields 49.40% enforcing against 47.14% under RFC 7489 — both are published, the RFC 7489 figure keeps the 2016 series continuous. DMARCbis adoption is still marginal: 392 domains (0.08%) publish np=, 88 publish psd=. 987 records carry a rua= tag that parses to no usable address at all.

#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
1Self-hosted / Other221 75446.20%
2Cloudflare DMARC28 1645.87%
3Valimail14 2992.98%
4Brevo (ex-Sendinblue)13 4992.81%
5Proofpoint EFD12 5682.62%
6dmarcian10 2512.14%
7Postmark DMARC7 3981.54%
8DMARC Analyzer6 8681.43%
9DMARC Advisor3 1300.65%
10DMARC Digests2 8380.59%
Show rows 11 – 25
#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
11PowerDMARC2 4540.51%
12Agari (Fortra)2 2430.47%
13URIports2 1600.45%
14DMARCLY1 8890.39%
15Barracuda1 5340.32%
16Google Workspace9770.20%
17EasyDMARC8400.18%
18MailHardener7250.15%
19Red Sift OnDMARC5740.12%
20Cisco Secure Email4020.08%
21Validity (Return Path)3080.06%
22Microsoft 3652910.06%
23Netcraft2880.06%
24TDMARC2140.04%
25MXToolbox420.01%

Mailbox provider × sending platform

Which sending platforms sit on top of which inbound stack. Cell = domains whose primary MX belongs to that mailbox provider and whose SPF authorises that ESP; the percentage is of that provider's domains. A domain may use several ESPs, so rows do not sum to 100%.

Mailbox providerAmazon SESSendGrid (Twilio)ZendeskMailgunMailchimpHubSpotMandrillSalesforceCloudflare Email RoutingMailjet (Sinch)
Self-Hosted2 862
1.86%		1 472
0.96%		774
0.50%		1 596
1.04%		1 409
0.92%		399
0.26%		1 161
0.76%		377
0.25%		102
0.07%		1 289
0.84%
Google Workspace14 675
10.05%		11 660
7.98%		11 117
7.61%		9 725
6.66%		9 080
6.22%		9 597
6.57%		8 348
5.72%		4 225
2.89%		333
0.23%		3 454
2.36%
Microsoft 3659 665
8.51%		9 250
8.14%		6 957
6.13%		6 343
5.58%		7 387
6.50%		6 488
5.71%		6 537
5.76%		7 070
6.22%		46
0.04%		4 216
3.71%
Proofpoint842
6.63%		684
5.38%		746
5.87%		336
2.64%		461
3.63%		461
3.63%		485
3.82%		1 105
8.70%		1
0.01%		252
1.98%
Cloudflare Email Routing245
2.12%		76
0.66%		67
0.58%		124
1.07%		32
0.28%		11
0.10%		20
0.17%		5
0.04%		11 319
97.93%		98
0.85%
Yandex 360153
1.40%		37
0.34%		31
0.28%		209
1.92%		71
0.65%		2
0.02%		67
0.62%		1
0.01%		7
0.06%		28
0.26%
Mimecast980
9.96%		1 019
10.36%		759
7.71%		520
5.28%		669
6.80%		774
7.87%		634
6.44%		1 135
11.53%		1
0.01%		200
2.03%
Hostinger48
0.54%		43
0.49%		9
0.10%		61
0.69%		7
0.08%		5
0.06%		4
0.05%		0
0.00%		7
0.08%		29
0.33%
Namecheap Email Forwarding14
0.19%		10
0.13%		4
0.05%		21
0.28%		2
0.03%		0
0.00%		6
0.08%		0
0.00%		4
0.05%		10
0.13%
Zoho Mail408
5.81%		176
2.51%		95
1.35%		316
4.50%		116
1.65%		19
0.27%		101
1.44%		4
0.06%		41
0.58%		105
1.49%

Reverse DNS: the failure nobody publishes

What this block shows. Every MX hostname in the snapshot was resolved to its addresses, and those addresses resolved back. A missing PTR is one of the very few things visible in DNS that makes large providers reject mail outright — a diagnosis, not a statistic.

51.12% of self-hosted domains publish a PTR that does not match the zone of their own MX host
22 190mail hosts with no reverse record at all, of 367 155 resolvable
867×the gap between running mail yourself and letting a large provider run it
31 834addresses carrying 2–100 mail hosts — there reputation is shared with the neighbours

No PTR, by mailbox provider

Self-Hosted8.67%
Unknown / Other6.67%
Generic / unmatched (mx*.*)5.30%
Generic / unmatched (mail.*)4.67%
Microsoft 3650.02%
Yandex 3600.01%

Run it yourself and it breaks; hand it to a provider and it does not. The dictionary classifies a domain as self-hosted when its MX lives under its own apex.

No PTR, by list position

Tranco top-1k5.70%
top-1k … 10k4.24%
top-10k … 100k4.74%
top-100k … 1M5.83%
not in current list8.17%

The gradient is weaker than for DMARC: the top of the list holds many large self-hosted operators, and they break it too.

No PTR, worst ccTLDs

.cn67.96%
.bd31.47%
.kr25.82%
.in17.10%
.ir13.81%
.cc11.65%
.pk11.63%
.ng10.56%
.hk9.09%
.kz8.52%

Zones with at least 500 domains in the snapshot. A whole ccTLD sitting high here usually means a handful of local hosters, not thousands of independent mistakes.

Top 100 most-used DMARC records (verbatim)

The literal record string copied verbatim from DNS — useful to spot copy-pasted "starter" policies and identify reporting endpoints (the rua= / ruf= tags) shared across many domains.

#DMARC recordDomains
1v=DMARC1; p=none;61 343
2v=DMARC1; p=none34 216
3v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com9 836
4v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;5 182
5v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;4 356
6v=DMARC1; p=reject;4 165
7v=DMARC1; p=quarantine4 101
8v=DMARC1;p=none;3 796
9v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.report@axa.com;3 467
10v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s3 127
11v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com3 089
12v=DMARC1; p=reject3 045
13v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r;2 493
14v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;2 254
15v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=1002 201
16v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; ruf=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=864002 081
17v=DMARC1;p=none1 829
18v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; sp=none1 761
19v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r;1 694
20v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;1 549
21v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=864001 309
22v=DMARC1;p=reject;1 304
23v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 279
24v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 279
25v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=11 203
Show rows 26 – 100
#DMARC recordDomains
26v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none1 153
27v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;1 122
28v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:ewai10d2@ag.eu.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:ewai10d2@fr.eu.dmarcian.com1 069
29v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;1 001
30v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;950
31v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com; ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com897
32v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com853
33v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; adkim=r; aspf=r;772
34v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100754
35v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email753
36v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100739
37v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com720
38v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s715
39v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400707
40v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com646
41v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com638
42v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400571
43v=DMARC1;p=quarantine561
44v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100;541
45v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s516
46v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;511
47v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@qq.com492
48v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;470
49v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100;463
50v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; adkim=r; aspf=r440
51v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r433
52v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100;371
53v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;371
54v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.report@axa.com;355
55v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r349
56v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400340
57v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; fo=1339
58v=DMARC1;p=reject331
59v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com; ruf=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com;329
60v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;323
61v=DMARC1320
62v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r317
63v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;311
64v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s310
65v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1302
66v=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com301
67v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400297
68v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com293
69v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; ruf=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; rf=afrf; pct=100291
70v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;pct=50;adkim=r;aspf=r;289
71v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:tnoff9hr@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; aspf=s; adkim=s;281
72v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com276
73v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zsrbf6su@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com;270
74v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100260
75v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:dmarc_report@service.aliyun.com248
76v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s;244
77v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;fo=1241
78v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua-mpse@mpub.ne.jp234
79v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;226
80v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-raports@dhosting.pl217
81v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; aspf=s; pct=100216
82v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc.rua@edrone.app; ruf=mailto:dmarc.ruf@edrone.app215
83v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@reporting.unisender.com208
84v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject207
85v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com201
86v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com200
87v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100200
88v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zicaptxt@ag.dmarcian.com;197
89v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com196
90v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;188
91v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;187
92v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:2ynhg3yt@ag.dmarcian.com186
93v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=r183
94v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject;180
95v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1178
96v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@ag.eu.dmarcly.com; ruf=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@fo.eu.dmarcly.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1;178
97v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r;177
98v=DMARC1; p=reject; ruf=mailto:dmarc@purelymail.com174
99v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s169
100v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;aspf=r;adkim=r;167
Is your domain one of them? More than half of DMARC-publishing domains enforce nothing — and most senders only find out from their open rates. Run a free inbox placement test: send a real message to our seed mailboxes at Gmail, Outlook, Yandex and Mail.ru and see where it lands — inbox, spam, or nowhere.
Test your deliverability →

Unmatched MX targets — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular MX hostnames our dictionary does not yet attribute to a named mailbox provider. Public list — these feed back into dictionaries/mx_providers.py for the next iteration so coverage keeps improving.

#MX targetDomains
1localhost443
2mx.services308
3mail243
4zonemx.eu227
5mail.parktons.com193
6mail1.sbnation.com165
7mail.pickelhost.com147
8alltheemails.com144
9mx.email-messaging.com135
10ns4.forevermail.com126
11lbmx.bcc.gov.bd126
12s.mail.dcsaas.net125
13ms06.cv-library.co.uk124
14ms07.cv-library.co.uk124
15ms08.cv-library.co.uk124
16mail.autoline.com.ua124
17mx2.z-ns.net123
18mxi.alpha-prm.jp116
19mail2.recop.jp115
20mx1d10.thinline.cz112
21mx1b20.thinline.cz112
22mx1.ticketsinbound.com110
23mx2.ticketsinbound.com107
24mail.mpcloud.net101
25mx-backup.serveriai.lt101
Show rows 26 – 100
#MX targetDomains
26mx.maxns.net97
27townsites.dnsmaster.net91
28mail-fr.securemail.pro91
29~90
30mx.aams4.jp90
31cloudmail.auto-vision.ru87
32mx1.netim.net87
33mx2.netim.net87
34mx-0.aams4.jp87
35mx-1.aams4.jp87
36mail.vipmailservice.com87
37amazon-smtp.amazon.com86
38mailforward.dnsv.jp81
39mailgw01.host.it81
40mailgw02.host.it80
41mx1-dk.centerasecurity.dk79
42mx2-dk.centerasecurity.dk79
43mx-01.mail-forwarder.io79
44mx.vshosting.eu78
45mx-02.mail-forwarder.io77
46mx1.email-cluster.com77
47mx2.email-cluster.com77
48failover1.email-cluster.com75
49mx3-dk.centerasecurity.dk73
50mx6.kvnbw.de73
51mx7.kvnbw.de73
52mx8.kvnbw.de73
53mx9.kvnbw.de73
54mx1.mgn.net72
55posta.mediacenter.hu71
56posta2.mediacenter.hu71
57posta4.mediacenter.hu71
58posta5.mediacenter.hu71
59email.webglobe.cz71
60email2.webglobe.cz71
61mx2.mgn.net71
62mx3.mgn.net71
63posta3.mediacenter.hu70
64email3.webglobe.cz70
65email4.webglobe.cz70
66mail.global.frontbridge.com70
67gmail22.gadmail.de70
68gmail23.gadmail.de70
69wmail22.gadmail.de70
70q01es.mail.s-web.de70
71q02es.mail.s-web.de70
72r01es.mail.s-web.de70
73r02es.mail.s-web.de70
74wmail23.gadmail.de69
75mx01.muumuu-mail.com68
76mx1.oderland.com67
77mx2.oderland.com67
78mxa.expediagroup.com67
79mxb.expediagroup.com67
80mx.sendcloud.org66
81rmail22.gadmail.de66
82rmail23.gadmail.de66
83smtp-avas.seeweb.it65
84omail22.gadmail.de65
85omail23.gadmail.de65
86mta.vshosting.eu64
87smtp.faisco.cn63
88mail.bluetie.com63
89mx3.oderland.com63
90mx4.oderland.com63
91mx4.nameshield.net63
92mx1.nepal.gov.np63
93mx1.simplelogin.co62
94mx2.simplelogin.co62
95void.blackhole.mx62
96mx1.daouoffice.com62
97mrelay2.axa.com62
98mx2.nepal.gov.np62
99mx01.statens-it.dk61
100mx02.statens-it.dk61

Unmatched SPF includes — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular SPF include: targets that don't match any known ESP, mailbox-as-sender, or SaaS pattern yet. Same feedback loop: top hits get added to dictionaries/esps.py or dictionaries/saas_senders.py.

#SPF includeDomains
1_spf.mail-neoserv.si137
2_spf.lh.pl133
3yunyou.top133
4spf.mailii.org132
5spf-bulk.axa.com132
6_spf.cv-library.co.uk124
7spf.w4ymail.at121
8_spf.tld-mx.com117
9relay.guzelhosting.com117
10spf.pitcom.net115
11spf.aams4.jp115
12_spf1-aws.recop.jp115
13spf.host-ww.net113
14_spf.edhost.eu112
15_spf.armada.it111
16_spf.exsilia.net109
17smtp-cluster.plusvps.com108
18_spf.abcp.ru107
19spf.emailfilter.io106
20spf.mailcamp.nl106
21mailii.org106
22_spf.yourfilter.nl104
23spf.shopserve.jp104
24spf.boldem.cz103
25_spf.wpopt.net103
Show rows 26 – 100
#SPF includeDomains
26_spf.localservices.com.br102
27spf-2248456.jmsend.com102
28spf.cesky-hosting.cz102
29mlrcloud.com102
30spf.betrend.com101
31relay.thundermail.uk100
32spf.satorimail.net100
33spf.v6send.net100
34spf.spcloud.jp100
35mfg.siteprotect.com99
36gateways.firstdata.com99
37dospf.simplepart.com99
38_spf.sendnode.com98
39_spf.axa.com98
40spf.mijndomeinhosting.nl98
41_pmta2.antevenio.com98
42send.k-crm.jp98
43spf.symplicity.com96
44mailing.eqs.com96
45amazon.com96
46_spf.octadesk.com96
47spf.host.it96
48_spf.academicworks.com95
49fmx.etius.jp95
50_spf.presscloud.com94
51spf.protection.outlook92
52_spf01.mykronos.com92
53_spf.aid.no92
54spf.ssmx.net91
55_spf.sent2email.com91
56spf.qboxmail.com91
57spf.form.run90
58_spf.simpleviewinc.com90
59sender.zcsend.jp90
60verifymyfafsa.com90
61senders.mailmasterplus.net89
62spf.qb-feedback.com88
63spf.zoner.fi88
64relay.email-cluster.com88
65spf.filteredmx.net87
66_spf.eemsg.mail.mil87
67all._spf.ds.network87
68ofsys.com86
69eversrv.com86
70ciphr247.com86
71spf.esvacloud.com86
72spf2.nlk2.smtps.jp86
73_spf.shared-server.net86
74spf.w2solution.com86
75_spf.goskope.com85
76spf.redpoints.com85
77spf84
78_spf.newsautodoc.com83
79mailmailmail.net83
80spf-us.appmail.granicusgovaccess.net83
81spf.chinaemail.cn83
82custmail.vdata.com83
83spf.protect.kvnbw.de82
84spf.sosafe.de82
85_spf-c.arukereso.hu82
86spf.rpost.net81
87universalspf.org79
88x.universalspf.org79
89no-ip.com79
90spf.gansend.com79
91spf.postbox.yandexcloud.net79
92_spf.herodesk-mails.io79
93spfv.global-mail.cn79
94spf.sabre.com78
95eur.pb-dynmktge.com78
96spfref.jackhenry.com78
97_spf.zorgmail.nl78
98limajo.witglobal.net77
99spf.cloud.simtechdev.us77
100email.nimbleams.com77

Methodology — how the numbers were produced

1. Data source

The dataset is the daily OpenINTEL forward-DNS Tranco snapshot (University of Twente / SURFnet / SIDN Labs). OpenINTEL queries the entire Tranco top-1M domain list daily for MX, TXT, NS, A, AAAA, SOA, CAA, DNSSEC and other records, publishing the results as Apache Parquet. For pre-2022 history we additionally use OpenINTEL's alexa source (the legacy Alexa top-1M list, retired 2023).

Cite: Roland van Rijswijk-Deij et al., "A High-Performance, Scalable Infrastructure for Large-Scale Active DNS Measurements", IEEE JSAC 2016.

1b. Where the rest of the analysis lives

Six deep-dive pages are rebuilt by the same daily run and were previously reachable only through the sitemap: SPF health (final all qualifier, DNS-lookup limit, record length) · Email security posture (MTA-STS, BIMI, TLS-RPT, DKIM selectors) · SaaS via verification tokens · DNS/NS providers · Country × ESP · Infrastructure & TLS.

2. Sample & cadence

Each report covers a single date — OpenINTEL publishes snapshot D on D+1, so the current UTC date is never treated as an expected snapshot. Freshness means matching the latest date actually present in the OpenINTEL catalogue, typically ~700 k domains with MX records and ~620 k with SPF. The pipeline runs daily at 03:00 UTC, after the usual source-publication window; each daily run produces an HTML report, a JSON summary, an updated time-series, and incremental updates to the domain registry (§ 12). No sub-sampling.

3. Mailbox provider classification

For each domain we read its MX RRset and pick the record with the lowest mx_preference as the primary mailbox host. The hostname of that primary MX is matched against an open regex dictionary (dictionaries/mx_providers.py, currently 328 patterns, hash below). Specific patterns (e.g. .mail.protection.outlook.com) are tried first; generic fallbacks (mail.*, mx*.*) only after. Domains whose MX matches no rule are kept as "Unknown / Other" — never dropped — and exported in Unmatched MX targets for dictionary improvement.

4. ESP / SaaS / forwarder / gateway classification (SPF-based)

For each domain's apex SPF record (TXT starting with v=spf1) we extract every include: and redirect= target and resolve them against open classification dictionaries (ESPs, mailbox-as-sender, anti-spam gateways, forwarders, SaaS senders, DMARC vendors, NS providers, verification tokens).

Resolution order: PURE_ESP → MAILBOX_AS_SENDER → GATEWAYS → FORWARDERS → bare-apex substring fallback → SAAS_SENDERS substring iteration. Bare-apex derivation strips leading _spf., _spf-eu., spf., mail. prefixes from dict keys to catch subdomain variants (e.g. _spf.m1.websupport.sk → matches websupport.sk). Malformed includes (no dot, <4 chars) are filtered.

One domain may use several ESPs simultaneously, so ESP shares sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains. Current SPF-include target coverage: 82.56%, recomputed from this snapshot rather than hard-coded.

Limitation: "flattened" SPF (where include chains were replaced with raw IP ranges to fit the 10-lookup limit) is not detectable from DNS alone — those domains appear ESP-less even when an ESP is in fact used.

5. DMARC (deep)

For each domain we query the _dmarc.<domain> TXT record. Records starting with v=DMARC1 are parsed for:

  • p= (apex policy): none / quarantine / reject / invalid
  • sp= (subdomain policy)
  • pct= (rollout percentage)
  • rua= aggregate-report destinations → classified into vendor buckets (Postmark DMARC, Valimail, dmarcian, URIports, EasyDMARC, Red Sift, Proofpoint EFD, Agari/Fortra, …) using dictionaries/dmarc_vendors.py

A domain is counted as enforced if p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100 (or pct absent — defaults to 100).

6. SPF mechanics & health

For every SPF record we additionally extract:

  • Final qualifier on the all mechanism: -all (hard fail), ~all (soft fail), ?all (neutral), +all (pass-everything — broken / dangerous), or missing
  • DNS lookup count (include:, redirect=, a:, mx:, exists:, ptr:) — each mechanism counts as 1 against the spec limit of 10. Records exceeding the limit return PermErr at recipients
  • Mechanism mix: include-only (modern), raw IP4/IP6 ranges only (legacy/flattened), mixed
  • Record byte length: percentiles to flag fragmentation risk (>450 B)

7. Email security maturity

Adoption of modern mail-security TXT records, parsed from the same OpenINTEL parquet:

  • MTA-STS: TXT at _mta-sts.<domain> with v=STSv1 — domain advertises required-TLS to its MX
  • BIMI: TXT at default._bimi.<domain> with v=BIMI1 — brand publishes a verified logo (requires p=reject)
  • TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting): TXT at _smtp._tls.<domain> with v=TLSRPTv1 — domain monitors TLS-failure reports
  • DKIM selectors: where the OpenINTEL scan includes *._domainkey.<domain> queries, well-known selectors (google, selector1/2, s1/s2, k1/k2/k3, mailo, mte1, …) are mapped to issuing ESPs

8. DNS provider classification

For each domain's NS RRset, every NS hostname is matched against a suffix dictionary (dictionaries/ns_providers.py) with patterns for Cloudflare, AWS Route 53, Azure DNS, Google Cloud DNS, GoDaddy, Akamai, NS1, UltraDNS, Yandex, DNSPod, Aliyun, OVH, Hetzner, Gandi, registrars, and others. A domain is assigned to its dominant NS provider; ties resolve to whichever pattern was matched first.

9. SaaS-via-verification-tokens

Many SaaS apps a domain is connected to never appear in SPF (because the SaaS doesn't send mail FROM the customer domain). To recover this signal we parse apex TXT records for verification tokens — google-site-verification=…, MS=…, atlassian-domain-verification=…, stripe-verification=…, plus 149 other patterns in dictionaries/verification_tokens.py. This produces a complementary "SaaS density" metric and surfaces apps that the SPF-only view misses.

10. Email infrastructure modernity

Three additional TLS / IPv6 metrics:

  • IPv6-on-MX: MX hostname has at least one AAAA record
  • DANE / TLSA on MX: TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx_host> (where the parquet includes TLSA queries)
  • CAA: any 0 issue … / 0 issuewild … record at apex; CAs aggregated into a market-share view (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, …)

11. Cross-tabulations

  • Country × ESP heatmap: top-15 ccTLDs × top-15 ESPs, cell = % of country's SPF-publishing domains using ESP X. Surfaces regional ESP champions (Brevo / FR, Unisender / RU, MailerLite / LT, Akna / BR, Shoptet / CZ).
  • Mailbox × ESP combinations: stacked frequency of common stack pairings — published as Mailbox provider × sending platform.

12. Domain registry & identifiers

Every domain ever observed across snapshots is assigned a stable integer ID in /var/openintel-cache/registry/domains.sqlite3 (currently 1 958 495 domains). Reports reference domains by ID rather than embedding strings; clients resolve names from a single gzipped registry dump (/email-stats/domains.csv.gz, 25.5 MB). This keeps per-report payloads compact, enables fast set-operation diffs across snapshots, and gives every domain a first-seen / last-seen timestamp.

13. Daily change-alerts feed

Each daily run computes a domain-level diff vs the previous scan and emits a change-feed at /email-stats/alerts.html (also as JSON + Atom). Detected events: ESP added/removed in SPF, DMARC policy upgrade/downgrade, primary-mailbox-provider change, SPF strict→soft regression, MTA-STS / BIMI first publication. Severity tag is good / bad / info.

14. Per-entity detail pages

The top-100 ESPs, top-100 SaaS senders and top-80 mailbox providers each have a dedicated detail page at /email-stats/detail/<kind>/<slug>.html showing KPI cards, a Chart.js sparkline (from history.json), TLD distribution and a sample of customer domains.

15. Tier breakdown

Each domain is assigned a tier from its Tranco rank: top-1k / top-10k / top-100k / top-1M, plus unranked for domains measured in the snapshot but absent from the current list file (rotation). Published as Authentication by Tranco tier: SPF, DMARC enforcement and self-hosting per tier.

16. Reproducibility & data hygiene

Dictionary hashes for this run (sha256, first 12 hex):

  • compliance.py — 76d502287abe
  • dmarc_vendors.py — 8c195eb564fc
  • esps.py — 0f7a40a1f7d3
  • mx_providers.py — c29c6e1b1f58
  • ns_providers.py — cc4f43c6651f
  • providers_meta.py — 5dc92db7869f
  • saas_meta.py — fe611e6e8a68
  • saas_senders.py — 1c5ebd9f7c09
  • tld_regions.py — 61e8bd3dcca8
  • verification_tokens.py — 6ba8313e55ab

Every published report includes the exact OpenINTEL date, dictionary file hashes, and counts of unmatched MX hosts and SPF includes — so any reader can verify or reproduce the figures. Raw OpenINTEL parquet is downloaded into a temporary cache and deleted after analysis; only aggregated, non-redistributable counts are kept long-term (per OpenINTEL data agreement). The domain registry stores names but no record-level content.

16b. Methodology changelog

Every change to a metric definition is recorded in the methodology changelog and stamped into each history point as methodology_version — so a step in a series can always be attributed to a formula change rather than to reality.

17. Limitations to be aware of

  • Tranco bias. Top-1M skews toward US/EU and global SaaS; ccTLD-only domains with low traffic may be under-represented. The alexa source used for pre-2022 history has a different composition and a different size: the alexa partition of 2022-04-01 contains 1 637 544 measured apex names against 1 087 498 in tranco on 2026-07-24, so absolute counts are not comparable across the 2022-08-11 boundary — only shares within a snapshot are.
  • SPF flattening hides ESP identity (see § 4).
  • CNAME chains on MX (e.g. mail.example.com → mail.example.protection.outlook.com) are not unrolled — only the first MX target is matched. This biases a small share of domains toward "Unknown" when their MX is a CNAME to a known provider.
  • Vanity MX with white-label provider (Mimecast/Proofpoint customers using their own brand) is not detectable from DNS alone.
  • DKIM enumeration is selector-based — only domains whose well-known selectors are scanned by OpenINTEL appear in the DKIM layer.
  • Long-tail unmatched: this snapshot contains 81 967 unique unclassified SPF targets. The count is published as a measured coverage KPI rather than a fixed estimate; many are regional hosters, tenant-specific endpoints, malformed records, or single-domain infrastructure.
  • Newly-added dictionary entries have no historical sparkline until ≥ 2 daily scans accumulate, since archived raw parquet is purged after parsing per the OpenINTEL data agreement.

Comments & corrections

Spotted a mis-classified MX target, missed ESP, or want to discuss a finding? We publish corrections in the next daily snapshot.

Send feedback to support@live-direct-marketing.online

Inline comments coming soon. For now, email is the fastest path — you'll see your fix reflected in tomorrow's run.

For press and analysts

What this block shows. The dataset is rebuilt every day and published under CC BY 4.0 — use the numbers, the charts and the PDF in your material, with a link back. If you need a cut that is not on this page, ask: we run it against the same snapshot and send it over.

Download the report (PDF) Headline numbers, charts and methodology in one file, rebuilt daily. Press kitCharts as PNG and WebP, ready to publish, with captions. Machine-readableJSON API, full time series, CSV exports, Atom change feed. Licence & citationCC BY 4.0, ready-made citation and BibTeX.
Need a custom cut? A single country, a single provider, a longer period, a comparison against your own list — we prepare it from the same daily snapshot and send the numbers with the date attached. No charge for editorial use.
Request data

Historical reports

Daily snapshots — last 90 days kept fully, older ones thinned to one point per month. Points marked partial are incomplete days at the source and are excluded from deltas and trends.

216 snapshots since 2016-01-22 — open the list
2026-09-03 — 675 596 MX, 641 147 SPF2026-09-02 — 674 627 MX, 639 932 SPF2026-09-01 — 674 958 MX, 640 343 SPF2026-08-31 — 679 421 MX, 644 387 SPF2026-08-30 — 680 695 MX, 645 473 SPF2026-08-29 — 618 823 MX, 587 379 SPF partial2026-08-28 — 677 171 MX, 642 062 SPF2026-08-27 — 677 157 MX, 641 959 SPF2026-08-26 — 677 089 MX, 641 830 SPF2026-08-25 — 677 219 MX, 641 893 SPF2026-08-24 — 676 834 MX, 641 489 SPF2026-08-23 — 676 669 MX, 641 394 SPF2026-08-22 — 676 355 MX, 641 125 SPF2026-08-21 — 681 191 MX, 645 688 SPF2026-08-20 — 674 470 MX, 639 419 SPF2026-08-19 — 672 105 MX, 637 085 SPF2026-08-18 — 671 693 MX, 636 741 SPF2026-08-17 — 671 752 MX, 636 637 SPF2026-08-16 — 674 092 MX, 638 721 SPF2026-08-14 — 663 240 MX, 628 485 SPF2026-08-13 — 663 264 MX, 628 572 SPF2026-08-12 — 663 252 MX, 628 407 SPF2026-08-11 — 662 761 MX, 627 932 SPF2026-08-10 — 662 160 MX, 627 184 SPF2026-08-09 — 661 672 MX, 626 624 SPF2026-08-08 — 670 439 MX, 634 892 SPF2026-08-07 — 670 484 MX, 634 873 SPF2026-08-06 — 668 231 MX, 632 544 SPF2026-08-05 — 680 832 MX, 644 102 SPF2026-08-04 — 664 122 MX, 628 339 SPF2026-08-02 — 664 010 MX, 628 104 SPF2026-08-01 — 667 030 MX, 630 925 SPF2026-07-31 — 667 040 MX, 630 769 SPF2026-07-30 — 667 152 MX, 630 662 SPF2026-07-29 — 666 778 MX, 630 142 SPF2026-07-28 — 666 803 MX, 630 030 SPF2026-07-27 — 666 750 MX, 629 781 SPF2026-07-26 — 667 887 MX, 630 738 SPF2026-07-25 — 671 693 MX, 634 220 SPF2026-07-24 — 668 195 MX, 626 838 SPF2026-07-23 — 668 612 MX, 627 156 SPF2026-07-22 — 667 580 MX, 626 173 SPF2026-07-21 — 667 464 MX, 626 022 SPF2026-07-20 — 668 961 MX, 627 463 SPF2026-07-19 — 659 183 MX, 618 199 SPF2026-07-18 — 659 259 MX, 618 271 SPF2026-07-17 — 659 253 MX, 618 231 SPF2026-07-16 — 659 459 MX, 618 470 SPF2026-07-15 — 659 420 MX, 618 461 SPF2026-07-14 — 659 112 MX, 618 197 SPF2026-07-13 — 658 711 MX, 617 702 SPF2026-07-12 — 658 108 MX, 617 244 SPF2026-07-11 — 657 701 MX, 616 967 SPF2026-07-10 — 657 207 MX, 616 333 SPF2026-07-09 — 657 304 MX, 616 494 SPF2026-07-08 — 656 808 MX, 615 969 SPF2026-07-07 — 655 988 MX, 615 231 SPF2026-07-06 — 655 261 MX, 614 575 SPF2026-07-05 — 654 926 MX, 614 272 SPF2026-07-04 — 665 047 MX, 623 765 SPF2026-07-03 — 664 686 MX, 623 266 SPF2026-07-02 — 664 961 MX, 623 597 SPF2026-07-01 — 664 715 MX, 623 370 SPF2026-06-30 — 665 299 MX, 624 066 SPF2026-06-29 — 671 597 MX, 630 016 SPF2026-06-28 — 667 370 MX, 626 001 SPF2026-06-27 — 666 220 MX, 624 986 SPF2026-06-26 — 666 177 MX, 624 950 SPF2026-06-25 — 665 951 MX, 624 772 SPF2026-06-24 — 665 655 MX, 624 551 SPF2026-06-23 — 665 823 MX, 624 757 SPF2026-06-22 — 665 950 MX, 625 047 SPF2026-06-21 — 667 342 MX, 626 553 SPF2026-06-20 — 669 301 MX, 628 455 SPF2026-06-19 — 661 817 MX, 621 795 SPF2026-06-18 — 661 882 MX, 622 049 SPF2026-06-17 — 661 091 MX, 621 709 SPF2026-06-16 — 660 933 MX, 621 836 SPF2026-06-15 — 662 137 MX, 623 017 SPF2026-06-14 — 650 734 MX, 612 415 SPF2026-06-13 — 650 753 MX, 612 354 SPF2026-06-12 — 651 025 MX, 612 617 SPF2026-06-11 — 651 209 MX, 612 707 SPF2026-06-10 — 651 319 MX, 612 713 SPF2026-06-09 — 650 861 MX, 612 459 SPF2026-06-08 — 650 013 MX, 611 648 SPF2026-06-07 — 649 787 MX, 611 420 SPF2026-06-01 — 662 428 MX, 622 222 SPF2026-05-18 — 653 826 MX, 613 816 SPF2026-05-11 — 654 275 MX, 614 529 SPF2026-05-04 — 662 839 MX, 622 414 SPF2026-04-30 — 665 325 MX, 624 448 SPF2026-04-27 — 665 219 MX, 624 507 SPF2026-03-01 — 683 543 MX, 639 798 SPF2026-02-01 — 688 114 MX, 641 985 SPF2026-01-01 — 660 114 MX, 616 352 SPF2025-12-01 — 668 692 MX, 622 313 SPF2025-11-01 — 659 524 MX, 613 922 SPF2025-10-01 — 644 366 MX, 599 103 SPF2025-09-01 — 685 366 MX, 635 390 SPF2025-08-01 — 681 988 MX, 632 521 SPF2025-07-01 — 687 700 MX, 638 068 SPF2025-06-01 — 699 879 MX, 648 954 SPF2025-05-01 — 711 257 MX, 659 028 SPF2025-04-01 — 702 306 MX, 651 786 SPF2025-03-01 — 705 611 MX, 653 173 SPF2025-02-01 — 696 358 MX, 644 666 SPF2025-01-01 — 674 214 MX, 626 064 SPF2024-12-01 — 675 247 MX, 626 465 SPF2024-11-01 — 669 912 MX, 614 354 SPF2024-10-01 — 659 879 MX, 603 315 SPF2024-09-01 — 660 693 MX, 604 347 SPF2024-08-01 — 639 733 MX, 586 007 SPF2024-07-02 — 632 526 MX, 578 066 SPF2024-06-01 — 614 961 MX, 562 373 SPF2024-05-01 — 621 817 MX, 566 602 SPF2024-04-01 — 641 948 MX, 582 732 SPF2024-03-01 — 666 638 MX, 601 954 SPF2024-02-01 — 653 497 MX, 588 373 SPF2024-01-01 — 657 371 MX, 586 519 SPF2023-12-01 — 660 455 MX, 588 456 SPF2023-11-01 — 666 944 MX, 591 587 SPF2023-10-01 — 675 039 MX, 597 200 SPF2023-09-01 — 694 895 MX, 612 567 SPF2023-08-01 — 716 729 MX, 622 501 SPF2023-07-01 — 653 321 MX, 565 370 SPF2023-06-01 — 656 260 MX, 561 661 SPF2023-05-01 — 657 236 MX, 561 046 SPF2023-04-01 — 662 162 MX, 562 122 SPF2023-03-01 — 730 155 MX, 620 415 SPF2023-02-01 — 715 023 MX, 602 519 SPF2023-01-01 — 712 767 MX, 599 702 SPF2022-12-01 — 712 641 MX, 594 977 SPF2022-11-01 — 710 891 MX, 590 969 SPF2022-10-01 — 716 152 MX, 594 587 SPF2022-09-01 — 716 956 MX, 595 410 SPF2022-08-11 — 427 823 MX, 354 634 SPF partial2022-07-01 — 968 388 MX, 789 788 SPF alexa2022-06-01 — 1 026 911 MX, 833 170 SPF alexa2022-05-01 — 921 706 MX, 748 398 SPF alexa2022-04-01 — 1 217 939 MX, 976 244 SPF alexa2022-03-01 — 975 521 MX, 779 131 SPF alexa2022-02-01 — 569 414 MX, 464 224 SPF partial alexa2022-01-01 — 552 174 MX, 447 427 SPF partial alexa2021-12-01 — 786 477 MX, 631 833 SPF alexa2021-11-01 — 525 808 MX, 424 311 SPF partial alexa2021-10-01 — 794 460 MX, 633 349 SPF alexa2021-09-01 — 788 407 MX, 628 585 SPF alexa2021-08-01 — 619 384 MX, 493 457 SPF partial alexa2021-07-01 — 728 817 MX, 579 133 SPF alexa2021-06-01 — 660 453 MX, 523 956 SPF alexa2021-05-01 — 788 324 MX, 620 170 SPF alexa2021-04-01 — 792 560 MX, 621 808 SPF alexa2021-03-01 — 646 458 MX, 507 824 SPF alexa2021-02-01 — 430 383 MX, 339 425 SPF partial alexa2021-01-01 — 714 286 MX, 554 817 SPF alexa2020-12-01 — 814 029 MX, 629 118 SPF alexa2020-11-01 — 748 490 MX, 574 865 SPF alexa2020-10-01 — 618 268 MX, 476 027 SPF partial alexa2020-09-01 — 768 508 MX, 586 561 SPF alexa2020-08-01 — 754 330 MX, 572 036 SPF alexa2020-07-01 — 947 188 MX, 717 066 SPF alexa2020-06-01 — 703 956 MX, 531 244 SPF partial alexa2020-05-01 — 965 680 MX, 721 262 SPF alexa2020-04-01 — 859 917 MX, 639 926 SPF alexa2020-03-01 — 780 292 MX, 579 459 SPF alexa2020-02-01 — 947 773 MX, 696 310 SPF alexa2020-01-01 — 565 274 MX, 417 038 SPF partial alexa2019-12-01 — 826 277 MX, 600 095 SPF alexa2019-11-01 — 1 039 570 MX, 747 867 SPF alexa2019-10-01 — 966 667 MX, 692 386 SPF alexa2019-09-01 — 838 362 MX, 594 935 SPF partial alexa2019-08-01 — 1 162 343 MX, 819 141 SPF alexa2019-07-01 — 1 177 952 MX, 806 744 SPF alexa2019-06-01 — 1 205 558 MX, 822 402 SPF alexa2019-05-01 — 1 196 890 MX, 811 837 SPF alexa2019-04-01 — 1 120 142 MX, 752 449 SPF alexa2019-03-01 — 1 170 801 MX, 787 932 SPF alexa2019-02-01 — 1 202 345 MX, 799 255 SPF alexa2019-01-01 — 1 190 206 MX, 783 686 SPF alexa2018-12-01 — 1 196 068 MX, 792 282 SPF alexa2018-11-01 — 1 177 133 MX, 775 137 SPF alexa2018-10-01 — 1 140 868 MX, 743 256 SPF alexa2018-09-01 — 1 183 473 MX, 765 011 SPF alexa2018-08-01 — 1 194 344 MX, 772 448 SPF alexa2018-07-01 — 1 165 617 MX, 745 554 SPF alexa2018-06-01 — 1 193 038 MX, 753 513 SPF alexa2018-05-01 — 1 168 881 MX, 732 275 SPF alexa2018-04-01 — 1 174 598 MX, 730 483 SPF alexa2018-03-01 — 827 056 MX, 516 103 SPF partial alexa2018-02-01 — 1 195 663 MX, 725 044 SPF alexa2018-01-01 — 813 525 MX, 512 876 SPF alexa2017-12-01 — 818 419 MX, 513 903 SPF alexa2017-11-01 — 815 080 MX, 507 477 SPF alexa2017-10-01 — 823 380 MX, 508 173 SPF alexa2017-09-01 — 815 671 MX, 500 347 SPF alexa2017-08-01 — 829 376 MX, 505 516 SPF alexa2017-07-01 — 830 824 MX, 502 438 SPF alexa2017-06-01 — 828 635 MX, 497 007 SPF partial alexa2017-05-01 — 828 210 MX, 493 097 SPF alexa2017-04-01 — 828 454 MX, 490 217 SPF alexa2017-03-01 — 824 804 MX, 483 151 SPF alexa2017-02-01 — 839 476 MX, 482 733 SPF alexa2017-01-01 — 827 995 MX, 470 990 SPF alexa2016-12-01 — 825 158 MX, 467 480 SPF alexa2016-11-01 — 837 849 MX, 472 624 SPF alexa2016-10-01 — 838 377 MX, 469 807 SPF alexa2016-09-01 — 835 089 MX, 462 936 SPF alexa2016-08-01 — 848 095 MX, 469 528 SPF alexa2016-07-01 — 842 098 MX, 463 893 SPF alexa2016-06-01 — 848 829 MX, 462 786 SPF alexa2016-05-01 — 843 824 MX, 455 820 SPF alexa2016-04-01 — 843 843 MX, 449 460 SPF alexa2016-03-01 — 865 090 MX, 456 873 SPF alexa2016-02-01 — 862 585 MX, 450 683 SPF alexa2016-01-22 — 845 356 MX, 440 606 SPF alexa
Data source: https://openintel.nl/data/forward-dns/top-lists/
Generated automatically from OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot 2026-09-04. Aggregates only — raw OpenINTEL data is deleted after analysis per their data agreement.
Last build: 2026-09-06T03:07:01Z.