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Inbox Placement Test
by Live Direct Marketing

What the current snapshot tells us

Three observations from Live Direct Marketing's analysis of the OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot on . These describe this measured population, not every domain on the Internet.

Two providers, a shared dependency

38.54%

of MX-publishing domains are attributed to Google Workspace or Microsoft 365 by their primary MX. This is the receiving side of email.

Compare mailbox providers →

Policy needs a feedback loop

35.90%

of DMARC publishers have no usable aggregate-reporting address in the parsed record. Explore the difference between publication, monitoring and enforcement.

Read the DMARC breakdown →

The long tail still matters

22.54%

of MX-publishing domains fall in the Self-Hosted classification. See how hostname rules distinguish named providers from the long tail.

Understand the long tail →

Go from a number to an explanation

Read the research behind the metrics, then follow the data into a provider, a policy or a domain.

01 / Mailbox market

Where does the Internet receive its email?

Named providers, regional hosting and the long tail. Understand what a primary MX record can tell us.

Read the mailbox provider study →
02 / Email authentication

A DMARC record is only the beginning.

Separate publishing a policy from requesting enforcement, and see why reporting addresses matter.

Read the DMARC adoption study →
03 / Company changes

What changed in a company's email stack?

Follow observed changes in MX, SPF and DMARC. A DNS change prompts investigation; it does not establish buying intent.

Understand the change signals →
Research by Artem Berezin · Live Direct Marketing
Source: OpenINTEL measurements · Methodology and limitations · Corrections
{inline_publications()}
For analysts, developers and agents

Use the data in your own work.

Current aggregates, historical snapshots, domain records and a public MCP endpoint. Bring the observation date, source and limitations along with every number.

CC BY 4.0 · Cite and reuse · Browse historical snapshots

Explore the full report

The complete snapshot, with accessible tables, interactive charts and definitions. Browse the domain directory or use the report sections below.

667 494
Domains with MX
633 491
Domains with SPF
473 642
Domains with DMARC
47.11%
DMARC enforced · among DMARC publishers

What you're looking at. Headline numbers for the analysed Tranco snapshot: how many domains publish each kind of email-related DNS record, and what share of DMARC publishers actually enforce their policy (quarantine/reject). Higher MX vs SPF gap = more domains receive mail than authorise sending; higher SPF vs DMARC gap = SPF adopted but no policy/feedback enforcement yet.

Classification coverage — what the dictionaries explain

66.26%
MX attributed to a vendor
11.20%
MX unresolved / generic
82.30%
SPF include targets classified
82 269
Unique unknown SPF targets

Coverage is recomputed from every snapshot. MX vendor attribution excludes self-hosted domains (22.54%); SPF coverage counts each distinct include:/redirect= target once per domain. Fully classified SPF stacks: 71.96% of domains that delegate through at least one include.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · KPIs

Top mailbox providers

What this block shows. Where each domain hosts incoming mail — derived from its primary MX record (lowest mx_preference). This is the receiving side of email: Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho, on-prem Exchange, etc. "Generic / unmatched" buckets are common mail.* / mx*.* hostnames we couldn't attribute to a specific provider; "Unknown / Other" is everything else. Note: Cloudflare Email Routing also appears in the ESP table below — that is the same service observed through two different record types (MX here, SPF there), not a double count of domains.

#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
1Self-Hosted →150 44822.54%
2Google Workspace →144 32721.62%
3Microsoft 365 →112 96416.92%
4Unknown / Other →43 9636.59%
5Generic / unmatched (mx*.*) →16 8752.53%
6Generic / unmatched (mail.*) →12 8891.93%
7Proofpoint →12 5971.89%
8Cloudflare Email Routing →11 5311.73%
9Yandex 360 →10 7311.61%
10Mimecast →9 7231.46%
Show rows 11 – 30
#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
11Hostinger →8 6061.29%
12Namecheap Email Forwarding →7 3281.10%
13Zoho Mail →6 9201.04%
14QQ Mail (Tencent) →5 3820.81%
15GoDaddy →5 2610.79%
16OVH Mail →5 1150.77%
17Amazon SES (inbound) →4 5550.68%
181&1 IONOS →4 4640.67%
19Mail.ru for Business →3 5160.53%
20Barracuda →3 3660.50%
21Proofpoint Essentials →2 9190.44%
22Jellyfish (Namecheap) →2 8470.43%
23SpamExperts (SolarWinds) →2 6200.39%
24Cisco IronPort →2 5130.38%
25Beget (RU) →2 5050.38%
26Rackspace Email →2 1530.32%
27Mailgun (inbound) →2 1260.32%
28Alibaba Mail (China) →1 9450.29%
29Zoho Mail (EU) →1 9240.29%
30Timeweb (RU) →1 8810.28%
🏠 Open Providers portfolio → cards with country, blurb, sparkline & TLD breakdown — click any provider name above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top mailbox providers

Long-tail / Unknown MX — the rest of the internet

What this block shows. The slice of domains whose mailbox cannot be attributed to a named provider — regional hosters, self-built Postfix/Exim, corporate gateways, niche ESPs. Researchers ask for this specifically because it captures the deliverability reality outside the Google / Microsoft monoculture. The detailed report drills down into Top-1000 most common unmatched hosts, 100 hand-picked curiosities (longest one-off names) and a TLD breakdown.

Unknown / Generic share
11.20%
74 752 domains
Unique unmatched MX hosts
35 894
individual hostnames in the long tail
Self-hosted
22.54%
150 448 domains running their own MX
📋 Open detailed long-tail report →·⬇ Download top-1000 unmatched MX (CSV)·⬇ Download 100 curiosities (CSV)

Authentication by Tranco tier

The same metrics cut by list position. Enforcement is a function of how big the site is: the gradient from the top of the list to the tail is the finding, not the average. "Not in current list" = domains measured in this snapshot that are absent from today's Tranco file (list rotation).

#TierDomains with MXSPFDMARC enforcedSelf-hosted
1Tranco top-1k69593.67%73.38%12.23%
2top-1k … 10k6 51392.94%56.64%15.00%
3top-10k … 100k64 13591.20%43.15%17.65%
4top-100k … 1M586 21289.72%28.04%23.05%
5not in current list9 93987.15%20.70%29.51%

Top ESPs / mass-mailing services

What this block shows. Outbound mass-mailing platforms each domain authorises in its SPF record — the marketing-automation, transactional-email and customer-engagement layer (SendGrid, Mailchimp, Mailgun, Klaviyo, HubSpot, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, etc.). One domain can use several ESPs, so percentages sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains.

#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Amazon SES →38 8446.13%
2SendGrid (Twilio) →29 2084.61%
3Mailgun →25 2503.99%
4Zendesk →23 6753.74%
5Mailchimp →22 5103.55%
6Mandrill →20 4743.23%
7HubSpot →19 5333.08%
8Salesforce →16 0232.53%
9Mailjet (Sinch) →13 3572.11%
10Cloudflare Email Routing →12 1231.91%
Show rows 11 – 30
#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Brevo (ex-Sendinblue) →9 2621.46%
12Mimecast →8 4571.33%
13Namecheap Forwarding →7 5921.20%
14MailChannels →6 4921.02%
15MailerLite →6 4881.02%
16Proofpoint →5 8270.92%
17Elastic Email →4 4320.70%
18Unisender (RU) →3 6620.58%
19Constant Contact →3 5840.57%
20Campaign Monitor →3 4780.55%
21Marketo (Adobe) →3 1900.50%
22Zoho Campaigns →3 1790.50%
23Postmark →2 9190.46%
24Emsd1 (transactional) →2 8890.46%
25SendPulse →2 8400.45%
26Exclaimer (signatures) →2 6480.42%
27SparkPost →2 6200.41%
28Zoho ZeptoMail →2 5500.40%
29Help Scout →2 2110.35%
30Salesforce Marketing Cloud →2 1660.34%
📮 Open Mailing services portfolio → all detected ESPs with descriptions, country, sparklines — click any ESP above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top ESPs

SaaS senders (Notion, Slack, Zendesk, Atlassian, Stripe…)

What this block shows. SaaS apps that send mail FROM a customer's domain on the customer's behalf — productivity, support, payments, HR, e-commerce and other business apps appearing as include: targets in the customer's SPF. Distinct from ESPs (mass-mailing platforms) and mailbox providers (where the inbox lives).

#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Shopify →5 4780.86%
2Pardot (Salesforce) →4 6770.74%
3CodeTwo Email Signatures 365 →4 3900.69%
4KnowBe4 →3 3470.53%
5Statuspage (Atlassian) →2 0270.32%
6BigCommerce →1 8490.29%
7Trustpilot →1 8490.29%
8Firebase (Google) →1 8300.29%
9Atlassian (Jira/Confluence) →1 7510.28%
10Lark / Feishu →1 2810.20%
Show rows 11 – 30
#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Sage Intacct →1 1230.18%
12NetSuite (Oracle) →1 1160.18%
13Oracle Cloud Email →1 0780.17%
14Qualtrics →1 0760.17%
15WordPress.com / WP Cloud →9970.16%
16SAP SuccessFactors →9390.15%
17Docebo (LMS) →9130.14%
18Oracle Cloud →8250.13%
19Zoho Books →7040.11%
20AFAS →6620.10%
21Greenhouse →6090.10%
22PayPal Braintree →5590.09%
23ClickDimensions →5480.09%
24UKG / UltiPro →5180.08%
25Autotask (ConnectWise) →4560.07%
26FormAssembly →4410.07%
27TOPdesk →4400.07%
28Odoo →4370.07%
29Zimpel (Cision) →4270.07%
30Shoptet →4120.07%
📧 Open SaaS/ESP senders portfolio → SaaS apps sending FROM customer domains — click any SaaS name above for detail

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top SaaS senders

DMARC adoption

What this block shows. The policy each DMARC-publishing domain advertises at _dmarc.<domain>: none = monitor only, quarantine = mark as spam on fail, reject = drop on fail, invalid = a syntactically broken record. "Enforced %" treats only quarantine / reject with pct=100 as actually enforcing.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC enforced %

7d ago▼ -0.07%30d ago▼ -0.18%

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC policies

Does the DMARC record actually do anything?

A three-way split instead of the usual enforced/not-enforced binary. Enforcing — p=quarantine or p=reject. Monitoring — p=none with a working rua= address: a legitimate rollout phase, someone is reading the reports. Inert — p=none with no reporting address at all: the record enforces nothing and reports nowhere.

35.90%
DMARC without reporting address
170 058 domains publish DMARC but receive no aggregate reports
24.56%
Inert records (p=none, no rua)
116 329 domains — the record does nothing at all
36.31%
Reports go to an external vendor only
171 973 domains send every report off-domain

Maturity split of 473 642 DMARC-publishing domains: 49.27% enforcing, 25.12% monitoring, 24.56% inert. Under DMARCbis (RFC 9989/9990/9991) the pct= tag no longer exists, so the same snapshot yields 49.27% enforcing against 47.11% under RFC 7489 — both are published, the RFC 7489 figure keeps the 2016 series continuous. DMARCbis adoption is still marginal: 387 domains (0.08%) publish np=, 90 publish psd=. 942 records carry a rua= tag that parses to no usable address at all.

#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
1Self-hosted / Other218 22746.07%
2Cloudflare DMARC27 8365.88%
3Valimail14 1402.99%
4Brevo (ex-Sendinblue)13 2262.79%
5Proofpoint EFD12 4532.63%
6dmarcian10 0182.12%
7Postmark DMARC7 3061.54%
8DMARC Analyzer6 7951.43%
9DMARC Advisor3 0840.65%
10DMARC Digests2 8230.60%
Show rows 11 – 25
#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
11PowerDMARC2 4130.51%
12Agari (Fortra)2 1890.46%
13URIports2 1340.45%
14DMARCLY1 8720.40%
15Barracuda1 5170.32%
16Google Workspace9720.21%
17EasyDMARC8300.18%
18MailHardener7150.15%
19Red Sift OnDMARC5710.12%
20Cisco Secure Email4000.08%
21Validity (Return Path)3000.06%
22Microsoft 3652900.06%
23Netcraft2870.06%
24TDMARC2120.04%
25MXToolbox380.01%

Mailbox provider × sending platform

Which sending platforms sit on top of which inbound stack. Cell = domains whose primary MX belongs to that mailbox provider and whose SPF authorises that ESP; the percentage is of that provider's domains. A domain may use several ESPs, so rows do not sum to 100%.

Mailbox providerAmazon SESSendGrid (Twilio)ZendeskMailgunMailchimpHubSpotMandrillSalesforceCloudflare Email RoutingMailjet (Sinch)
Self-Hosted2 843
1.89%		1 453
0.97%		778
0.52%		1 577
1.05%		1 379
0.92%		393
0.26%		1 149
0.76%		372
0.25%		104
0.07%		1 256
0.83%
Google Workspace14 568
10.09%		11 561
8.01%		11 032
7.64%		9 606
6.66%		8 956
6.21%		9 519
6.60%		8 276
5.73%		4 202
2.91%		333
0.23%		3 411
2.36%
Microsoft 3659 658
8.55%		9 212
8.15%		6 933
6.14%		6 281
5.56%		7 328
6.49%		6 435
5.70%		6 501
5.75%		7 029
6.22%		41
0.04%		4 235
3.75%
Proofpoint830
6.59%		680
5.40%		743
5.90%		333
2.64%		453
3.60%		458
3.64%		479
3.80%		1 100
8.73%		1
0.01%		248
1.97%
Cloudflare Email Routing247
2.14%		78
0.68%		64
0.56%		121
1.05%		31
0.27%		11
0.10%		21
0.18%		6
0.05%		11 292
97.93%		96
0.83%
Yandex 360152
1.42%		36
0.34%		31
0.29%		207
1.93%		72
0.67%		2
0.02%		67
0.62%		1
0.01%		7
0.07%		27
0.25%
Mimecast971
9.99%		1 009
10.38%		743
7.64%		511
5.26%		663
6.82%		758
7.80%		623
6.41%		1 129
11.61%		1
0.01%		197
2.03%
Hostinger44
0.51%		41
0.48%		8
0.09%		59
0.69%		7
0.08%		5
0.06%		4
0.05%		0
0.00%		7
0.08%		27
0.31%
Namecheap Email Forwarding12
0.16%		10
0.14%		4
0.05%		21
0.29%		2
0.03%		0
0.00%		6
0.08%		0
0.00%		4
0.05%		10
0.14%
Zoho Mail407
5.88%		172
2.49%		95
1.37%		315
4.55%		113
1.63%		18
0.26%		97
1.40%		3
0.04%		42
0.61%		101
1.46%

Reverse DNS of inbound MX addresses

PTR is measured separately from the OpenINTEL snapshot. These addresses receive mail; they do not identify the actual sending IP. Forward-confirmed reverse DNS, outbound use and delivery are not measured here.

Last stored DNS attempt: 2026-09-08 10:55:22 UTC. Complete current observations: 237 693 of 375 795 MX hostnames in this snapshot. The freshness window is 14 days; this is not a daily check of every MX.

15 614 of 237 693 completely measured MX hosts returned negative PTR answers for every address. A partial check of the first few addresses cannot establish that result.

No PTR by mailbox provider

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
Self-Hosted140 3047.25% (10 175)
Google Workspace122 3150.00% (0)
Unknown / Other37 7784.74% (1 790)
Generic / unmatched (mx*.*)14 6994.69% (690)
Proofpoint12 1440.00% (0)
Generic / unmatched (mail.*)10 9193.14% (343)
Yandex 36010 6780.00% (0)
Hostinger8 58299.45% (8 535)
Namecheap Email Forwarding7 2740.00% (0)
Zoho Mail6 8910.00% (0)
QQ Mail (Tencent)5 35199.85% (5 343)
GoDaddy5 2020.00% (0)

No PTR by list position

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
top_1k4946.68% (33)
top_10k4 5434.40% (200)
top_100k43 9845.79% (2 547)
top_1m412 1187.31% (30 109)
unranked7 51811.24% (845)

No PTR by ccTLD

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
cn3 83969.03% (2 650)
kr2 47127.48% (679)
in6 56815.33% (1 007)
pk1 08513.55% (147)
hk52911.72% (62)
ir2 20610.65% (235)
cc1 05610.13% (107)
kz9059.72% (88)
lt6479.12% (59)
id2 6998.93% (241)

56.75% of 140 304 completely measured self-hosted domains have observed PTR names entirely outside the study domain. This is a relationship between names, not a DNS-zone or FCrDNS test.

31 074 observed IPs are associated with 2–100 current MX hostnames. This does not identify shared sending reputation.

Stale: 575; legacy results without per-address outcomes: 627; not cached: 1 397; partial address coverage: 119 443. These categories can overlap. Incomplete and unknown domains are excluded from percentages.

Next check: obtain the actual sending IP, query its PTR records, then resolve those names to A/AAAA and compare the IPs. A PTR name outside this domain alone does not establish a configuration failure.

Top 100 most-used DMARC records (verbatim)

The literal record string copied verbatim from DNS — useful to spot copy-pasted "starter" policies and identify reporting endpoints (the rua= / ruf= tags) shared across many domains.

#DMARC recordDomains
1v=DMARC1; p=none;60 087
2v=DMARC1; p=none33 594
3v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com9 514
4v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;5 043
5v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;4 235
6v=DMARC1; p=reject;4 104
7v=DMARC1; p=quarantine4 011
8v=DMARC1;p=none;3 564
9v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.report@axa.com;3 130
10v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com3 060
11v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s3 010
12v=DMARC1; p=reject2 988
13v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r;2 421
14v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;2 145
15v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=1002 126
16v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; ruf=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=864001 986
17v=DMARC1;p=none1 783
18v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; sp=none1 730
19v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r;1 663
20v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;1 531
21v=DMARC1;p=reject;1 279
22v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 270
23v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 254
24v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=864001 205
25v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=11 158
Show rows 26 – 100
#DMARC recordDomains
26v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none1 121
27v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;1 106
28v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:ewai10d2@ag.eu.dmarcian.com; ruf=mailto:ewai10d2@fr.eu.dmarcian.com1 028
29v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;929
30v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;920
31v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com; ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com899
32v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com847
33v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; adkim=r; aspf=r;749
34v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email744
35v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100736
36v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100713
37v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com695
38v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s685
39v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400666
40v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com642
41v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com617
42v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400545
43v=DMARC1;p=quarantine542
44v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100;534
45v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;503
46v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s491
47v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@qq.com484
48v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;459
49v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100;455
50v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; adkim=r; aspf=r424
51v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r404
52v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;366
53v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100;359
54v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r354
55v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; fo=1339
56v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com; ruf=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com;329
57v=DMARC1;p=reject323
58v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;319
59v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;313
60v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400312
61v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r311
62v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s305
63v=DMARC1303
64v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc.report@axa.com;302
65v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1297
66v=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com296
67v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com292
68v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;pct=50;adkim=r;aspf=r;284
69v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com275
70v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:tnoff9hr@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; aspf=s; adkim=s;275
71v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400272
72v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; ruf=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; rf=afrf; pct=100269
73v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zsrbf6su@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com;266
74v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;fo=1240
75v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s;239
76v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua-mpse@mpub.ne.jp232
77v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:dmarc_report@service.aliyun.com226
78v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-raports@dhosting.pl217
79v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;214
80v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc.rua@edrone.app; ruf=mailto:dmarc.ruf@edrone.app212
81v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@reporting.unisender.com207
82v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject204
83v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com198
84v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zicaptxt@ag.dmarcian.com;197
85v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; aspf=s; pct=100194
86v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com191
87v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com188
88v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100184
89v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;184
90v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=r182
91v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r;178
92v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@ag.eu.dmarcly.com; ruf=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@fo.eu.dmarcly.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1;178
93v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;177
94v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject;177
95v=DMARC1; p=reject; ruf=mailto:dmarc@purelymail.com174
96v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1174
97v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100167
98v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s165
99v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@fbl.optin.com;162
100v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400160
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Unmatched MX targets — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular MX hostnames our dictionary does not yet attribute to a named mailbox provider. Public list — these feed back into dictionaries/mx_providers.py for the next iteration so coverage keeps improving.

#MX targetDomains
1mail.levikof.com996
2localhost419
3mail243
4mail.parktons.com176
5mail1.sbnation.com165
6alltheemails.com143
7mail.pickelhost.com139
8mx.email-messaging.com138
9ms06.cv-library.co.uk134
10ms07.cv-library.co.uk134
11ms08.cv-library.co.uk134
12ns4.forevermail.com130
13lbmx.bcc.gov.bd127
14s.mail.dcsaas.net127
15mail.autoline.com.ua118
16mx2.z-ns.net117
17mxi.alpha-prm.jp115
18mx1d10.thinline.cz112
19mx1b20.thinline.cz112
20mail2.recop.jp110
21mx1.ticketsinbound.com105
22mx2.ticketsinbound.com102
23mail.mpcloud.net101
24mx.maxns.net95
25mx-backup.serveriai.lt94
Show rows 26 – 100
#MX targetDomains
26~93
27mx2.netim.net90
28mx.aams4.jp90
29townsites.dnsmaster.net90
30mail-fr.securemail.pro90
31mx1.netim.net89
32mx-0.aams4.jp87
33mx-1.aams4.jp87
34cloudmail.auto-vision.ru86
35amazon-smtp.amazon.com84
36mailgw01.host.it83
37mail.vipmailservice.com83
38mailgw02.host.it81
39mailforward.dnsv.jp80
40mx-01.mail-forwarder.io78
41mx.vshosting.eu77
42mx1-dk.centerasecurity.dk76
43mx2-dk.centerasecurity.dk76
44mx-02.mail-forwarder.io76
45mx1.email-cluster.com76
46mx2.email-cluster.com76
47failover1.email-cluster.com74
48mx1.mgn.net72
49mx2.mgn.net71
50mx3.mgn.net71
51mx6.kvnbw.de71
52mx7.kvnbw.de71
53mx8.kvnbw.de71
54mx9.kvnbw.de71
55posta.mediacenter.hu70
56posta2.mediacenter.hu70
57posta4.mediacenter.hu70
58posta5.mediacenter.hu70
59email.webglobe.cz70
60email2.webglobe.cz70
61mx3-dk.centerasecurity.dk70
62mail.global.frontbridge.com70
63q01es.mail.s-web.de70
64q02es.mail.s-web.de70
65r01es.mail.s-web.de70
66r02es.mail.s-web.de70
67posta3.mediacenter.hu69
68mx1.oderland.com69
69mx2.oderland.com69
70email3.webglobe.cz69
71email4.webglobe.cz69
72mx01.muumuu-mail.com68
73mxa.expediagroup.com67
74mxb.expediagroup.com67
75mx.sendcloud.org66
76gmail22.gadmail.de66
77gmail23.gadmail.de66
78wmail22.gadmail.de66
79mail.bluetie.com65
80mta.vshosting.eu65
81wmail23.gadmail.de65
82mx3.oderland.com64
83mx4.oderland.com64
84mx1.nepal.gov.np64
85mx2.nepal.gov.np63
86smtp.faisco.cn62
87mx1.simplelogin.co62
88mx2.simplelogin.co62
89smtp-avas.seeweb.it62
90mx1.daouoffice.com62
91mrelay2.axa.com62
92mx01.statens-it.dk62
93mx02.statens-it.dk62
94mx03.statens-it.dk62
95mx04.statens-it.dk62
96mx05.statens-it.dk62
97mx06.statens-it.dk62
98mx07.statens-it.dk62
99mx08.statens-it.dk62
100rmail22.gadmail.de62

Unmatched SPF includes — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular SPF include: targets that don't match any known ESP, mailbox-as-sender, or SaaS pattern yet. Same feedback loop: top hits get added to dictionaries/esps.py or dictionaries/saas_senders.py.

#SPF includeDomains
1spf.jetsmtp.net449
2_spf.mail-neoserv.si139
3_spf.cv-library.co.uk134
4_spf.lh.pl132
5yunyou.top131
6spf.mailii.org130
7spf-bulk.axa.com121
8spf.w4ymail.at120
9_spf.abcp.ru119
10spf.pitcom.net115
11relay.guzelhosting.com115
12_spf.tld-mx.com114
13spf.host-ww.net112
14_spf.armada.it112
15spf.aams4.jp112
16_spf.edhost.eu111
17_spf1-aws.recop.jp111
18_spf.exsilia.net105
19spf.mailcamp.nl104
20spf.cesky-hosting.cz104
21_spf.wpopt.net103
22spf.emailfilter.io102
23_spf.yourfilter.nl102
24mlrcloud.com102
25mailii.org102
Show rows 26 – 100
#SPF includeDomains
26spf-2248456.jmsend.com101
27spf.boldem.cz101
28spf.shopserve.jp101
29spf.betrend.com101
30smtp-cluster.plusvps.com101
31spf.spcloud.jp101
32_spf.localservices.com.br101
33spf.satorimail.net100
34spf.host.it99
35_spf.axa.com97
36send.k-crm.jp97
37_pmta2.antevenio.com96
38_spf.sendnode.com96
39mfg.siteprotect.com96
40spf.mijndomeinhosting.nl96
41_spf.octadesk.com96
42spf.symplicity.com95
43mailing.eqs.com95
44spf.v6send.net95
45_spf.academicworks.com95
46amazon.com94
47dospf.simplepart.com94
48spf.protection.outlook93
49_spf01.mykronos.com93
50_spf.presscloud.com93
51gateways.firstdata.com93
52relay.thundermail.uk92
53spf.form.run91
54_spf.aid.no91
55_spf.sent2email.com90
56fmx.etius.jp90
57spf.ssmx.net89
58_spf.simpleviewinc.com89
59relay.email-cluster.com89
60sender.zcsend.jp89
61verifymyfafsa.com89
62spf.qb-feedback.com88
63all._spf.ds.network88
64_spf.eemsg.mail.mil88
65spf.qboxmail.com88
66spf.zoner.fi87
67senders.mailmasterplus.net87
68eversrv.com86
69_spf.goskope.com86
70spf.w2solution.com86
71spf2.nlk2.smtps.jp86
72ofsys.com85
73spf.filteredmx.net85
74spf.esvacloud.com85
75spf.redpoints.com85
76_spf.shared-server.net84
77_spf.newsautodoc.com83
78mailmailmail.net83
79spf.postbox.yandexcloud.net83
80_spf-c.arukereso.hu83
81spf.chinaemail.cn82
82spf.rpost.net82
83spf.sosafe.de81
84spf-us.appmail.granicusgovaccess.net81
85spf81
86ciphr247.com81
87spfv.global-mail.cn81
88spf.protect.kvnbw.de80
89custmail.vdata.com80
90spf.sabre.com79
91no-ip.com79
92universalspf.org78
93x.universalspf.org78
94eur.pb-dynmktge.com78
95_spf.herodesk-mails.io78
96spf.gansend.com78
97spfref.jackhenry.com78
98limajo.witglobal.net77
99email.nimbleams.com77
100support.gov.sg77

Methodology — how the numbers were produced

1. Data source

The dataset is the daily OpenINTEL forward-DNS Tranco snapshot (University of Twente / SURFnet / SIDN Labs). OpenINTEL queries the entire Tranco top-1M domain list daily for MX, TXT, NS, A, AAAA, SOA, CAA, DNSSEC and other records, publishing the results as Apache Parquet. For pre-2022 history we additionally use OpenINTEL's alexa source (the legacy Alexa top-1M list, retired 2023).

Cite: Roland van Rijswijk-Deij et al., "A High-Performance, Scalable Infrastructure for Large-Scale Active DNS Measurements", IEEE JSAC 2016.

1b. Where the rest of the analysis lives

Six deep-dive pages are rebuilt by the same daily run and were previously reachable only through the sitemap: SPF health (final all qualifier, DNS-lookup limit, record length) · Email security posture (MTA-STS, BIMI, TLS-RPT, DKIM selectors) · SaaS via verification tokens · DNS/NS providers · Country × ESP · Infrastructure & TLS.

2. Sample & cadence

Each report covers a single date — OpenINTEL publishes snapshot D on D+1, so the current UTC date is never treated as an expected snapshot. Freshness means matching the latest date actually present in the OpenINTEL catalogue, typically ~700 k domains with MX records and ~620 k with SPF. The pipeline runs daily at 03:00 UTC, after the usual source-publication window; each daily run produces an HTML report, a JSON summary, an updated time-series, and incremental updates to the domain registry (§ 12). No sub-sampling.

3. Mailbox provider classification

For each domain we read its MX RRset and pick the record with the lowest mx_preference as the primary mailbox host. The hostname of that primary MX is matched against an open regex dictionary (dictionaries/mx_providers.py, currently 330 patterns, hash below). Specific patterns (e.g. .mail.protection.outlook.com) are tried first; generic fallbacks (mail.*, mx*.*) only after. Domains whose MX matches no rule are kept as "Unknown / Other" — never dropped — and exported in Unmatched MX targets for dictionary improvement.

4. ESP / SaaS / forwarder / gateway classification (SPF-based)

For each domain's apex SPF record (TXT starting with v=spf1) we extract every include: and redirect= target and resolve them against open classification dictionaries (ESPs, mailbox-as-sender, anti-spam gateways, forwarders, SaaS senders, DMARC vendors, NS providers, verification tokens).

Resolution order: PURE_ESP → MAILBOX_AS_SENDER → GATEWAYS → FORWARDERS → bare-apex substring fallback → SAAS_SENDERS substring iteration. Bare-apex derivation strips leading _spf., _spf-eu., spf., mail. prefixes from dict keys to catch subdomain variants (e.g. _spf.m1.websupport.sk → matches websupport.sk). Malformed includes (no dot, <4 chars) are filtered.

One domain may use several ESPs simultaneously, so ESP shares sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains. Current SPF-include target coverage: 82.30%, recomputed from this snapshot rather than hard-coded.

Limitation: "flattened" SPF (where include chains were replaced with raw IP ranges to fit the 10-lookup limit) is not detectable from DNS alone — those domains appear ESP-less even when an ESP is in fact used.

5. DMARC (deep)

For each domain we query the _dmarc.<domain> TXT record. Records starting with v=DMARC1 are parsed for:

  • p= (apex policy): none / quarantine / reject / invalid
  • sp= (subdomain policy)
  • pct= (rollout percentage)
  • rua= aggregate-report destinations → classified into vendor buckets (Postmark DMARC, Valimail, dmarcian, URIports, EasyDMARC, Red Sift, Proofpoint EFD, Agari/Fortra, …) using dictionaries/dmarc_vendors.py

A domain is counted as enforced if p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100 (or pct absent — defaults to 100).

6. SPF mechanics & health

For every SPF record we additionally extract:

  • Final qualifier on the all mechanism: -all (hard fail), ~all (soft fail), ?all (neutral), +all (pass-everything — broken / dangerous), or missing
  • DNS lookup count (include:, redirect=, a:, mx:, exists:, ptr:) — each mechanism counts as 1 against the spec limit of 10. Records exceeding the limit return PermErr at recipients
  • Mechanism mix: include-only (modern), raw IP4/IP6 ranges only (legacy/flattened), mixed
  • Record byte length: percentiles to flag fragmentation risk (>450 B)

7. Email security maturity

Adoption of modern mail-security TXT records, parsed from the same OpenINTEL parquet:

  • MTA-STS: TXT at _mta-sts.<domain> with v=STSv1 — domain advertises required-TLS to its MX
  • BIMI: TXT at default._bimi.<domain> with v=BIMI1 — brand publishes a verified logo (requires p=reject)
  • TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting): TXT at _smtp._tls.<domain> with v=TLSRPTv1 — domain monitors TLS-failure reports
  • DKIM selectors: where the OpenINTEL scan includes *._domainkey.<domain> queries, well-known selectors (google, selector1/2, s1/s2, k1/k2/k3, mailo, mte1, …) are mapped to issuing ESPs

8. DNS provider classification

For each domain's NS RRset, every NS hostname is matched against a suffix dictionary (dictionaries/ns_providers.py) with patterns for Cloudflare, AWS Route 53, Azure DNS, Google Cloud DNS, GoDaddy, Akamai, NS1, UltraDNS, Yandex, DNSPod, Aliyun, OVH, Hetzner, Gandi, registrars, and others. A domain is assigned to its dominant NS provider; ties resolve to whichever pattern was matched first.

9. SaaS-via-verification-tokens

Many SaaS apps a domain is connected to never appear in SPF (because the SaaS doesn't send mail FROM the customer domain). To recover this signal we parse apex TXT records for verification tokens — google-site-verification=…, MS=…, atlassian-domain-verification=…, stripe-verification=…, plus 149 other patterns in dictionaries/verification_tokens.py. This produces a complementary "SaaS density" metric and surfaces apps that the SPF-only view misses.

10. Email infrastructure modernity

Three additional TLS / IPv6 metrics:

  • IPv6-on-MX: MX hostname has at least one AAAA record
  • DANE / TLSA on MX: TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx_host> (where the parquet includes TLSA queries)
  • CAA: any 0 issue … / 0 issuewild … record at apex; CAs aggregated into a market-share view (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, …)

11. Cross-tabulations

  • Country × ESP heatmap: top-15 ccTLDs × top-15 ESPs, cell = % of country's SPF-publishing domains using ESP X. Surfaces regional ESP champions (Brevo / FR, Unisender / RU, MailerLite / LT, Akna / BR, Shoptet / CZ).
  • Mailbox × ESP combinations: stacked frequency of common stack pairings — published as Mailbox provider × sending platform.

12. Domain registry & identifiers

Every domain ever observed across snapshots is assigned a stable integer ID in /var/openintel-cache/registry/domains.sqlite3 (currently 1 970 222 domains). Reports reference domains by ID rather than embedding strings; clients resolve names from a single gzipped registry dump (/email-stats/domains.csv.gz, 25.7 MB). This keeps per-report payloads compact, enables fast set-operation diffs across snapshots, and gives every domain a first-seen / last-seen timestamp.

13. Daily change-alerts feed

Each daily run computes a domain-level diff vs the previous scan and emits a change-feed at /email-stats/alerts.html (also as JSON + Atom). Detected events: ESP added/removed in SPF, DMARC policy upgrade/downgrade, primary-mailbox-provider change, SPF strict→soft regression, MTA-STS / BIMI first publication. Severity tag is good / bad / info.

14. Per-entity detail pages

The top-100 ESPs, top-100 SaaS senders and top-80 mailbox providers each have a dedicated detail page at /email-stats/detail/<kind>/<slug>.html showing KPI cards, a Chart.js sparkline (from history.json), TLD distribution and a sample of customer domains.

15. Tier breakdown

Each domain is assigned a tier from its Tranco rank: top-1k / top-10k / top-100k / top-1M, plus unranked for domains measured in the snapshot but absent from the current list file (rotation). Published as Authentication by Tranco tier: SPF, DMARC enforcement and self-hosting per tier.

16. Reproducibility & data hygiene

Dictionary hashes for this run (sha256, first 12 hex):

  • compliance.py — 76d502287abe
  • dmarc_vendors.py — 8c195eb564fc
  • domain_match.py — 8411162f72b7
  • esps.py — 206a79aab417
  • mx_providers.py — 23fb265346a7
  • mx_selection.py — 8e9445ccc3e3
  • ns_providers.py — cc4f43c6651f
  • providers_meta.py — 8222adcb331d
  • saas_meta.py — 10901ef58846
  • saas_senders.py — 9ffa69056163
  • tld_regions.py — 61e8bd3dcca8
  • verification_tokens.py — 6ba8313e55ab

Every published report includes the exact OpenINTEL date, dictionary file hashes, and counts of unmatched MX hosts and SPF includes — so any reader can verify or reproduce the figures. Raw OpenINTEL parquet is downloaded into a temporary cache and deleted after analysis; only aggregated, non-redistributable counts are kept long-term (per OpenINTEL data agreement). The domain registry stores names but no record-level content.

16b. Methodology changelog

Every change to a metric definition is recorded in the methodology changelog and stamped into each history point as methodology_version — so a step in a series can always be attributed to a formula change rather than to reality.

17. Limitations to be aware of

  • Tranco bias. Top-1M skews toward US/EU and global SaaS; ccTLD-only domains with low traffic may be under-represented. The alexa source used for pre-2022 history has a different composition and a different size: the alexa partition of 2022-04-01 contains 1 637 544 measured apex names against 1 087 498 in tranco on 2026-07-24, so absolute counts are not comparable across the 2022-08-11 boundary — only shares within a snapshot are.
  • SPF flattening hides ESP identity (see § 4).
  • CNAME chains on MX (e.g. mail.example.com → mail.example.protection.outlook.com) are not unrolled — only the first MX target is matched. This biases a small share of domains toward "Unknown" when their MX is a CNAME to a known provider.
  • Vanity MX with white-label provider (Mimecast/Proofpoint customers using their own brand) is not detectable from DNS alone.
  • DKIM enumeration is selector-based — only domains whose well-known selectors are scanned by OpenINTEL appear in the DKIM layer.
  • Long-tail unmatched: this snapshot contains 82 269 unique unclassified SPF targets. The count is published as a measured coverage KPI rather than a fixed estimate; many are regional hosters, tenant-specific endpoints, malformed records, or single-domain infrastructure.
  • Newly-added dictionary entries have no historical sparkline until ≥ 2 daily scans accumulate, since archived raw parquet is purged after parsing per the OpenINTEL data agreement.

Comments & corrections

Spotted a mis-classified MX target, missed ESP, or want to discuss a finding? We publish corrections in the next daily snapshot.

Send feedback to support@live-direct-marketing.online

Inline comments coming soon. For now, email is the fastest path — you'll see your fix reflected in tomorrow's run.

For press and analysts

What this block shows. The dataset is rebuilt every day and published under CC BY 4.0 — use the numbers, the charts and the PDF in your material, with a link back. If you need a cut that is not on this page, ask: we run it against the same snapshot and send it over.

Download the report (PDF) Headline numbers, charts and methodology in one file, rebuilt daily. Press kitCharts as PNG and WebP, ready to publish, with captions. Machine-readableJSON API, full time series, CSV exports, Atom change feed. Licence & citationCC BY 4.0, ready-made citation and BibTeX.
Need a custom cut? A single country, a single provider, a longer period, a comparison against your own list — we prepare it from the same daily snapshot and send the numbers with the date attached. No charge for editorial use.
Request data

Historical reports

Daily snapshots — last 90 days kept fully, older ones thinned to one point per month. Points marked partial are incomplete days at the source and are excluded from deltas and trends.

217 snapshots since 2016-01-22 — open the list
2026-09-08 — 667 494 MX, 633 491 SPF2026-09-07 — 666 076 MX, 632 414 SPF2026-09-06 — 665 504 MX, 631 995 SPF2026-09-05 — 666 937 MX, 633 359 SPF2026-09-04 — 676 554 MX, 642 190 SPF2026-09-03 — 675 596 MX, 641 147 SPF2026-09-02 — 674 627 MX, 639 932 SPF2026-09-01 — 674 958 MX, 640 343 SPF2026-08-31 — 679 421 MX, 644 387 SPF2026-08-30 — 680 695 MX, 645 473 SPF2026-08-29 — 618 823 MX, 587 379 SPF partial2026-08-28 — 677 171 MX, 642 062 SPF2026-08-27 — 677 157 MX, 641 959 SPF2026-08-26 — 677 089 MX, 641 830 SPF2026-08-25 — 677 219 MX, 641 893 SPF2026-08-24 — 676 834 MX, 641 489 SPF2026-08-23 — 676 669 MX, 641 394 SPF2026-08-22 — 676 355 MX, 641 125 SPF2026-08-21 — 681 191 MX, 645 688 SPF2026-08-20 — 674 470 MX, 639 419 SPF2026-08-19 — 672 105 MX, 637 085 SPF2026-08-18 — 671 693 MX, 636 741 SPF2026-08-17 — 671 752 MX, 636 637 SPF2026-08-16 — 674 092 MX, 638 721 SPF2026-08-14 — 663 240 MX, 628 485 SPF2026-08-13 — 663 264 MX, 628 572 SPF2026-08-12 — 663 252 MX, 628 407 SPF2026-08-11 — 662 761 MX, 627 932 SPF2026-08-10 — 662 160 MX, 627 184 SPF2026-08-09 — 661 672 MX, 626 624 SPF2026-08-08 — 670 439 MX, 634 892 SPF2026-08-07 — 670 484 MX, 634 873 SPF2026-08-06 — 668 231 MX, 632 544 SPF2026-08-05 — 680 832 MX, 644 102 SPF2026-08-04 — 664 122 MX, 628 339 SPF2026-08-02 — 664 010 MX, 628 104 SPF2026-08-01 — 667 030 MX, 630 925 SPF2026-07-31 — 667 040 MX, 630 769 SPF2026-07-30 — 667 152 MX, 630 662 SPF2026-07-29 — 666 778 MX, 630 142 SPF2026-07-28 — 666 803 MX, 630 030 SPF2026-07-27 — 666 750 MX, 629 781 SPF2026-07-26 — 667 887 MX, 630 738 SPF2026-07-25 — 671 693 MX, 634 220 SPF2026-07-24 — 668 195 MX, 626 838 SPF2026-07-23 — 668 612 MX, 627 156 SPF2026-07-22 — 667 580 MX, 626 173 SPF2026-07-21 — 667 464 MX, 626 022 SPF2026-07-20 — 668 961 MX, 627 463 SPF2026-07-19 — 659 183 MX, 618 199 SPF2026-07-18 — 659 259 MX, 618 271 SPF2026-07-17 — 659 253 MX, 618 231 SPF2026-07-16 — 659 459 MX, 618 470 SPF2026-07-15 — 659 420 MX, 618 461 SPF2026-07-14 — 659 112 MX, 618 197 SPF2026-07-13 — 658 711 MX, 617 702 SPF2026-07-12 — 658 108 MX, 617 244 SPF2026-07-11 — 657 701 MX, 616 967 SPF2026-07-10 — 657 207 MX, 616 333 SPF2026-07-09 — 657 304 MX, 616 494 SPF2026-07-08 — 656 808 MX, 615 969 SPF2026-07-07 — 655 988 MX, 615 231 SPF2026-07-06 — 655 261 MX, 614 575 SPF2026-07-05 — 654 926 MX, 614 272 SPF2026-07-04 — 665 047 MX, 623 765 SPF2026-07-03 — 664 686 MX, 623 266 SPF2026-07-02 — 664 961 MX, 623 597 SPF2026-07-01 — 664 715 MX, 623 370 SPF2026-06-30 — 665 299 MX, 624 066 SPF2026-06-29 — 671 597 MX, 630 016 SPF2026-06-28 — 667 370 MX, 626 001 SPF2026-06-27 — 666 220 MX, 624 986 SPF2026-06-26 — 666 177 MX, 624 950 SPF2026-06-25 — 665 951 MX, 624 772 SPF2026-06-24 — 665 655 MX, 624 551 SPF2026-06-23 — 665 823 MX, 624 757 SPF2026-06-22 — 665 950 MX, 625 047 SPF2026-06-21 — 667 342 MX, 626 553 SPF2026-06-20 — 669 301 MX, 628 455 SPF2026-06-19 — 661 817 MX, 621 795 SPF2026-06-18 — 661 882 MX, 622 049 SPF2026-06-17 — 661 091 MX, 621 709 SPF2026-06-16 — 660 933 MX, 621 836 SPF2026-06-15 — 662 137 MX, 623 017 SPF2026-06-14 — 650 734 MX, 612 415 SPF2026-06-13 — 650 753 MX, 612 354 SPF2026-06-12 — 651 025 MX, 612 617 SPF2026-06-08 — 650 013 MX, 611 648 SPF2026-06-01 — 662 428 MX, 622 222 SPF2026-05-18 — 653 826 MX, 613 816 SPF2026-05-11 — 654 275 MX, 614 529 SPF2026-05-04 — 662 839 MX, 622 414 SPF2026-04-30 — 665 325 MX, 624 448 SPF2026-04-27 — 665 219 MX, 624 507 SPF2026-03-01 — 683 543 MX, 639 798 SPF2026-02-01 — 688 114 MX, 641 985 SPF2026-01-01 — 660 114 MX, 616 352 SPF2025-12-01 — 668 692 MX, 622 313 SPF2025-11-01 — 659 524 MX, 613 922 SPF2025-10-01 — 644 366 MX, 599 103 SPF2025-09-01 — 685 366 MX, 635 390 SPF2025-08-01 — 681 988 MX, 632 521 SPF2025-07-01 — 687 700 MX, 638 068 SPF2025-06-01 — 699 879 MX, 648 954 SPF2025-05-01 — 711 257 MX, 659 028 SPF2025-04-01 — 702 306 MX, 651 786 SPF2025-03-01 — 705 611 MX, 653 173 SPF2025-02-01 — 696 358 MX, 644 666 SPF2025-01-01 — 674 214 MX, 626 064 SPF2024-12-01 — 675 247 MX, 626 465 SPF2024-11-01 — 669 912 MX, 614 354 SPF2024-10-01 — 659 879 MX, 603 315 SPF2024-09-01 — 660 693 MX, 604 347 SPF2024-08-01 — 639 733 MX, 586 007 SPF2024-07-02 — 632 526 MX, 578 066 SPF2024-06-01 — 614 961 MX, 562 373 SPF2024-05-01 — 621 817 MX, 566 602 SPF2024-04-01 — 641 948 MX, 582 732 SPF2024-03-01 — 666 638 MX, 601 954 SPF2024-02-01 — 653 497 MX, 588 373 SPF2024-01-01 — 657 371 MX, 586 519 SPF2023-12-01 — 660 455 MX, 588 456 SPF2023-11-01 — 666 944 MX, 591 587 SPF2023-10-01 — 675 039 MX, 597 200 SPF2023-09-01 — 694 895 MX, 612 567 SPF2023-08-01 — 716 729 MX, 622 501 SPF2023-07-01 — 653 321 MX, 565 370 SPF2023-06-01 — 656 260 MX, 561 661 SPF2023-05-01 — 657 236 MX, 561 046 SPF2023-04-01 — 662 162 MX, 562 122 SPF2023-03-01 — 730 155 MX, 620 415 SPF2023-02-01 — 715 023 MX, 602 519 SPF2023-01-01 — 712 767 MX, 599 702 SPF2022-12-01 — 712 641 MX, 594 977 SPF2022-11-01 — 710 891 MX, 590 969 SPF2022-10-01 — 716 152 MX, 594 587 SPF2022-09-01 — 716 956 MX, 595 410 SPF2022-08-11 — 427 823 MX, 354 634 SPF partial2022-07-01 — 968 388 MX, 789 788 SPF alexa2022-06-01 — 1 026 911 MX, 833 170 SPF alexa2022-05-01 — 921 706 MX, 748 398 SPF alexa2022-04-01 — 1 217 939 MX, 976 244 SPF alexa2022-03-01 — 975 521 MX, 779 131 SPF alexa2022-02-01 — 569 414 MX, 464 224 SPF partial alexa2022-01-01 — 552 174 MX, 447 427 SPF partial alexa2021-12-01 — 786 477 MX, 631 833 SPF alexa2021-11-01 — 525 808 MX, 424 311 SPF partial alexa2021-10-01 — 794 460 MX, 633 349 SPF alexa2021-09-01 — 788 407 MX, 628 585 SPF alexa2021-08-01 — 619 384 MX, 493 457 SPF partial alexa2021-07-01 — 728 817 MX, 579 133 SPF alexa2021-06-01 — 660 453 MX, 523 956 SPF alexa2021-05-01 — 788 324 MX, 620 170 SPF alexa2021-04-01 — 792 560 MX, 621 808 SPF alexa2021-03-01 — 646 458 MX, 507 824 SPF alexa2021-02-01 — 430 383 MX, 339 425 SPF partial alexa2021-01-01 — 714 286 MX, 554 817 SPF alexa2020-12-01 — 814 029 MX, 629 118 SPF alexa2020-11-01 — 748 490 MX, 574 865 SPF alexa2020-10-01 — 618 268 MX, 476 027 SPF partial alexa2020-09-01 — 768 508 MX, 586 561 SPF alexa2020-08-01 — 754 330 MX, 572 036 SPF alexa2020-07-01 — 947 188 MX, 717 066 SPF alexa2020-06-01 — 703 956 MX, 531 244 SPF partial alexa2020-05-01 — 965 680 MX, 721 262 SPF alexa2020-04-01 — 859 917 MX, 639 926 SPF alexa2020-03-01 — 780 292 MX, 579 459 SPF alexa2020-02-01 — 947 773 MX, 696 310 SPF alexa2020-01-01 — 565 274 MX, 417 038 SPF partial alexa2019-12-01 — 826 277 MX, 600 095 SPF alexa2019-11-01 — 1 039 570 MX, 747 867 SPF alexa2019-10-01 — 966 667 MX, 692 386 SPF alexa2019-09-01 — 838 362 MX, 594 935 SPF partial alexa2019-08-01 — 1 162 343 MX, 819 141 SPF alexa2019-07-01 — 1 177 952 MX, 806 744 SPF alexa2019-06-01 — 1 205 558 MX, 822 402 SPF alexa2019-05-01 — 1 196 890 MX, 811 837 SPF alexa2019-04-01 — 1 120 142 MX, 752 449 SPF alexa2019-03-01 — 1 170 801 MX, 787 932 SPF alexa2019-02-01 — 1 202 345 MX, 799 255 SPF alexa2019-01-01 — 1 190 206 MX, 783 686 SPF alexa2018-12-01 — 1 196 068 MX, 792 282 SPF alexa2018-11-01 — 1 177 133 MX, 775 137 SPF alexa2018-10-01 — 1 140 868 MX, 743 256 SPF alexa2018-09-01 — 1 183 473 MX, 765 011 SPF alexa2018-08-01 — 1 194 344 MX, 772 448 SPF alexa2018-07-01 — 1 165 617 MX, 745 554 SPF alexa2018-06-01 — 1 193 038 MX, 753 513 SPF alexa2018-05-01 — 1 168 881 MX, 732 275 SPF alexa2018-04-01 — 1 174 598 MX, 730 483 SPF alexa2018-03-01 — 827 056 MX, 516 103 SPF partial alexa2018-02-01 — 1 195 663 MX, 725 044 SPF alexa2018-01-01 — 813 525 MX, 512 876 SPF alexa2017-12-01 — 818 419 MX, 513 903 SPF alexa2017-11-01 — 815 080 MX, 507 477 SPF alexa2017-10-01 — 823 380 MX, 508 173 SPF alexa2017-09-01 — 815 671 MX, 500 347 SPF alexa2017-08-01 — 829 376 MX, 505 516 SPF alexa2017-07-01 — 830 824 MX, 502 438 SPF alexa2017-06-01 — 828 635 MX, 497 007 SPF partial alexa2017-05-01 — 828 210 MX, 493 097 SPF alexa2017-04-01 — 828 454 MX, 490 217 SPF alexa2017-03-01 — 824 804 MX, 483 151 SPF alexa2017-02-01 — 839 476 MX, 482 733 SPF alexa2017-01-01 — 827 995 MX, 470 990 SPF alexa2016-12-01 — 825 158 MX, 467 480 SPF alexa2016-11-01 — 837 849 MX, 472 624 SPF alexa2016-10-01 — 838 377 MX, 469 807 SPF alexa2016-09-01 — 835 089 MX, 462 936 SPF alexa2016-08-01 — 848 095 MX, 469 528 SPF alexa2016-07-01 — 842 098 MX, 463 893 SPF alexa2016-06-01 — 848 829 MX, 462 786 SPF alexa2016-05-01 — 843 824 MX, 455 820 SPF alexa2016-04-01 — 843 843 MX, 449 460 SPF alexa2016-03-01 — 865 090 MX, 456 873 SPF alexa2016-02-01 — 862 585 MX, 450 683 SPF alexa2016-01-22 — 845 356 MX, 440 606 SPF alexa
Data source: https://openintel.nl/data/forward-dns/top-lists/
Generated automatically from OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot 2026-09-08. Aggregates only — raw OpenINTEL data is deleted after analysis per their data agreement.
Last build: 2026-09-10T03:17:47Z.