Live Direct Marketing logo
Inbox Placement Test
by Live Direct Marketing

What the current snapshot tells us

Three observations from Live Direct Marketing's analysis of the OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot on . These describe this measured population, not every domain on the Internet.

Two providers, a shared dependency

38.61%

of MX-publishing domains are attributed to Google Workspace or Microsoft 365 by their primary MX. This is the receiving side of email.

Compare mailbox providers →

Policy needs a feedback loop

35.87%

of DMARC publishers have no usable aggregate-reporting address in the parsed record. Explore the difference between publication, monitoring and enforcement.

Read the DMARC breakdown →

The long tail still matters

22.56%

of MX-publishing domains fall in the Self-Hosted classification. See how hostname rules distinguish named providers from the long tail.

Understand the long tail →

Go from a number to an explanation

Read the research behind the metrics, then follow the data into a provider, a policy or a domain.

01 / Mailbox market

Where does the Internet receive its email?

Named providers, regional hosting and the long tail. Understand what a primary MX record can tell us.

Read the mailbox provider study →
02 / Email authentication

A DMARC record is only the beginning.

Separate publishing a policy from requesting enforcement, and see why reporting addresses matter.

Read the DMARC adoption study →
03 / Company changes

What changed in a company's email stack?

Follow observed changes in MX, SPF and DMARC. A DNS change prompts investigation; it does not establish buying intent.

Understand the change signals →
Research by Artem Berezin · Live Direct Marketing
Source: OpenINTEL measurements · Methodology and limitations · Corrections
{inline_publications()}
For analysts, developers and agents

Use the data in your own work.

Current aggregates, historical snapshots, domain records and a public MCP endpoint. Bring the observation date, source and limitations along with every number.

CC BY 4.0 · Cite and reuse · Browse historical snapshots

Explore the full report

The complete snapshot, with accessible tables, interactive charts and definitions. Browse the domain directory or use the report sections below.

675 489
Domains with MX
637 420
Domains with SPF
476 253
Domains with DMARC
47.04%
DMARC enforced · among DMARC publishers

What you're looking at. Headline numbers for the analysed Tranco snapshot: how many domains publish each kind of email-related DNS record, and what share of DMARC publishers actually enforce their policy (quarantine/reject). Higher MX vs SPF gap = more domains receive mail than authorise sending; higher SPF vs DMARC gap = SPF adopted but no policy/feedback enforcement yet.

Classification coverage — what the dictionaries explain

66.13%
MX attributed to a vendor
11.30%
MX unresolved / generic
82.31%
SPF include targets classified
83 105
Unique unknown SPF targets

Coverage is recomputed from every snapshot. MX vendor attribution excludes self-hosted domains (22.56%); SPF coverage counts each distinct include:/redirect= target once per domain. Fully classified SPF stacks: 71.86% of domains that delegate through at least one include.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · KPIs

Top mailbox providers

What this block shows. Where each domain hosts incoming mail — derived from its primary MX record (lowest mx_preference). This is the receiving side of email: Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Zoho, on-prem Exchange, etc. "Generic / unmatched" buckets are common mail.* / mx*.* hostnames we couldn't attribute to a specific provider; "Unknown / Other" is everything else. Note: Cloudflare Email Routing also appears in the ESP table below — that is the same service observed through two different record types (MX here, SPF there), not a double count of domains.

#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
1Self-Hosted →152 39922.56%
2Google Workspace →145 79121.58%
3Microsoft 365 →115 06317.03%
4Unknown / Other →45 1356.68%
5Generic / unmatched (mx*.*) →17 1112.53%
6Generic / unmatched (mail.*) →13 0651.93%
7Proofpoint →12 5441.86%
8Cloudflare Email Routing →11 9031.76%
9Yandex 360 →11 2771.67%
10Mimecast →9 9421.47%
Show rows 11 – 30
#Mailbox providerDomainsShare of MX-having domains
11Hostinger →7 5781.12%
12Namecheap Email Forwarding →7 0521.04%
13Zoho Mail →6 9361.03%
14QQ Mail (Tencent) →5 6790.84%
15GoDaddy →5 1220.76%
16OVH Mail →5 0780.75%
17Amazon SES (inbound) →4 5740.68%
181&1 IONOS →4 5580.67%
19Mail.ru for Business →3 7490.56%
20Barracuda →3 4920.52%
21Proofpoint Essentials →2 8960.43%
22Beget (RU) →2 6670.39%
23SpamExperts (SolarWinds) →2 6210.39%
24Cisco IronPort →2 5310.37%
25Jellyfish (Namecheap) →2 4030.36%
26Mailgun (inbound) →2 1610.32%
27Rackspace Email →2 1600.32%
28Timeweb (RU) →2 0700.31%
29Alibaba Mail (China) →2 0120.30%
30Zoho Mail (EU) →1 9020.28%
🏠 Open Providers portfolio → cards with country, blurb, sparkline & TLD breakdown — click any provider name above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top mailbox providers

Long-tail / Unknown MX — the rest of the internet

What this block shows. The slice of domains whose mailbox cannot be attributed to a named provider — regional hosters, self-built Postfix/Exim, corporate gateways, niche ESPs. Researchers ask for this specifically because it captures the deliverability reality outside the Google / Microsoft monoculture. The detailed report drills down into Top-1000 most common unmatched hosts, 100 hand-picked curiosities (longest one-off names) and a TLD breakdown.

Unknown / Generic share
11.30%
76 364 domains
Unique unmatched MX hosts
36 716
individual hostnames in the long tail
Self-hosted
22.56%
152 399 domains running their own MX
📋 Open detailed long-tail report →·⬇ Download top-1000 unmatched MX (CSV)·⬇ Download 100 curiosities (CSV)

Authentication by Tranco tier

The same metrics cut by list position. Enforcement is a function of how big the site is: the gradient from the top of the list to the tail is the finding, not the average. "Not in current list" = domains measured in this snapshot that are absent from today's Tranco file (list rotation).

#TierDomains with MXSPFDMARC enforcedSelf-hosted
1Tranco top-1k69593.67%73.96%11.94%
2top-1k … 10k6 46092.89%56.86%15.08%
3top-10k … 100k64 72391.28%43.64%17.58%
4top-100k … 1M596 37389.82%28.43%23.17%
5not in current list7 23887.99%19.98%24.80%

Top ESPs / mass-mailing services

What this block shows. Outbound mass-mailing platforms each domain authorises in its SPF record — the marketing-automation, transactional-email and customer-engagement layer (SendGrid, Mailchimp, Mailgun, Klaviyo, HubSpot, Salesforce Marketing Cloud, etc.). One domain can use several ESPs, so percentages sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains.

#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Amazon SES →39 6806.23%
2SendGrid (Twilio) →29 8054.68%
3Mailgun →25 5664.01%
4Zendesk →24 0143.77%
5Mailchimp →22 9883.61%
6Mandrill →20 7973.26%
7HubSpot →20 2793.18%
8Salesforce →16 3892.57%
9Mailjet (Sinch) →13 6352.14%
10Cloudflare Email Routing →12 5031.96%
Show rows 11 – 30
#ESPDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Brevo (ex-Sendinblue) →9 4991.49%
12Mimecast →8 6921.36%
13Namecheap Forwarding →7 3261.15%
14MailChannels →6 8281.07%
15MailerLite →6 5601.03%
16Proofpoint →5 7470.90%
17Elastic Email →4 4490.70%
18Unisender (RU) →3 8690.61%
19Constant Contact →3 7160.58%
20Campaign Monitor →3 5920.56%
21Zoho Campaigns →3 2140.50%
22Marketo (Adobe) →3 1980.50%
23Postmark →3 0130.47%
24Emsd1 (transactional) →2 9190.46%
25SendPulse →2 9170.46%
26Exclaimer (signatures) →2 7500.43%
27SparkPost →2 7230.43%
28Zoho ZeptoMail →2 5950.41%
29Help Scout →2 2370.35%
30Barracuda Essentials →2 1840.34%
📮 Open Mailing services portfolio → all detected ESPs with descriptions, country, sparklines — click any ESP above to drill into a detail page

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top ESPs

SaaS senders (Notion, Slack, Zendesk, Atlassian, Stripe…)

What this block shows. SaaS apps that send mail FROM a customer's domain on the customer's behalf — productivity, support, payments, HR, e-commerce and other business apps appearing as include: targets in the customer's SPF. Distinct from ESPs (mass-mailing platforms) and mailbox providers (where the inbox lives).

#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
1Shopify →5 3450.84%
2Pardot (Salesforce) →4 7700.75%
3CodeTwo Email Signatures 365 →4 5500.71%
4KnowBe4 →3 4590.54%
5Statuspage (Atlassian) →2 0750.33%
6Trustpilot →1 8910.30%
7Firebase (Google) →1 8690.29%
8Atlassian (Jira/Confluence) →1 7870.28%
9BigCommerce →1 7240.27%
10Lark / Feishu →1 3060.20%
Show rows 11 – 30
#SaaS appDomainsShare of SPF-publishing domains
11Sage Intacct →1 1710.18%
12NetSuite (Oracle) →1 1510.18%
13Oracle Cloud Email →1 1220.18%
14Qualtrics →1 0890.17%
15WordPress.com / WP Cloud →1 0060.16%
16SAP SuccessFactors →9600.15%
17Docebo (LMS) →9440.15%
18Oracle Cloud →8580.13%
19Zoho Books →7150.11%
20AFAS →6850.11%
21Greenhouse →6220.10%
22PayPal Braintree →5710.09%
23ClickDimensions →5680.09%
24UKG / UltiPro →5450.09%
25Autotask (ConnectWise) →4780.07%
26TOPdesk →4740.07%
27FormAssembly →4640.07%
28Odoo →4470.07%
29Zimpel (Cision) →4350.07%
30ConnectWise →4280.07%
📧 Open SaaS/ESP senders portfolio → SaaS apps sending FROM customer domains — click any SaaS name above for detail

Trend — last 30 day(s) · Top SaaS senders

DMARC adoption

What this block shows. The policy each DMARC-publishing domain advertises at _dmarc.<domain>: none = monitor only, quarantine = mark as spam on fail, reject = drop on fail, invalid = a syntactically broken record. "Enforced %" treats only quarantine / reject with pct=100 as actually enforcing.

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC enforced %

7d ago▲ +0.23%30d ago▼ -0.37%

Trend — last 30 day(s) · DMARC policies

Does the DMARC record actually do anything?

A three-way split instead of the usual enforced/not-enforced binary. Enforcing — p=quarantine or p=reject. Monitoring — p=none with a working rua= address: a legitimate rollout phase, someone is reading the reports. Inert — p=none with no reporting address at all: the record enforces nothing and reports nowhere.

35.87%
DMARC without reporting address
170 843 domains publish DMARC but receive no aggregate reports
24.30%
Inert records (p=none, no rua)
115 747 domains — the record does nothing at all
35.73%
Reports go to an external vendor only
170 153 domains send every report off-domain

Maturity split of 476 253 DMARC-publishing domains: 49.23% enforcing, 25.43% monitoring, 24.30% inert. Under DMARCbis (RFC 9989/9990/9991) the pct= tag no longer exists, so the same snapshot yields 49.23% enforcing against 47.04% under RFC 7489 — both are published, the RFC 7489 figure keeps the 2016 series continuous. DMARCbis adoption is still marginal: 452 domains (0.09%) publish np=, 98 publish psd=. 962 records carry a rua= tag that parses to no usable address at all.

#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
1Self-hosted / Other219 49046.09%
2Cloudflare DMARC28 8356.05%
3Valimail14 4493.03%
4Brevo (ex-Sendinblue)13 4042.81%
5Proofpoint EFD12 5012.62%
6dmarcian8 9121.87%
7Postmark DMARC7 5221.58%
8DMARC Analyzer6 9161.45%
9DMARC Advisor3 1040.65%
10DMARC Digests2 8640.60%
Show rows 11 – 25
#DMARC reporting destinationDomainsShare of DMARC publishers
11PowerDMARC2 4920.52%
12URIports2 2020.46%
13Agari (Fortra)2 1820.46%
14DMARCLY1 9030.40%
15Barracuda1 5810.33%
16Google Workspace9460.20%
17EasyDMARC8510.18%
18MailHardener7490.16%
19Red Sift OnDMARC5910.12%
20Cisco Secure Email3850.08%
21Microsoft 3652990.06%
22Netcraft2920.06%
23Validity (Return Path)2890.06%
24TDMARC2300.05%
25MXToolbox410.01%

Mailbox provider × sending platform

Which sending platforms sit on top of which inbound stack. Cell = domains whose primary MX belongs to that mailbox provider and whose SPF authorises that ESP; the percentage is of that provider's domains. A domain may use several ESPs, so rows do not sum to 100%.

Mailbox providerAmazon SESSendGrid (Twilio)ZendeskMailchimpMailgunHubSpotMandrillSalesforceCloudflare Email RoutingMailjet (Sinch)
Self-Hosted2 867
1.88%		1 520
1.00%		776
0.51%		1 393
0.91%		1 560
1.02%		400
0.26%		1 149
0.75%		365
0.24%		107
0.07%		1 272
0.83%
Google Workspace14 952
10.26%		11 732
8.05%		11 216
7.69%		9 114
6.25%		9 703
6.66%		9 851
6.76%		8 397
5.76%		4 307
2.95%		336
0.23%		3 494
2.40%
Microsoft 3659 865
8.57%		9 411
8.18%		7 043
6.12%		7 548
6.56%		6 409
5.57%		6 745
5.86%		6 639
5.77%		7 230
6.28%		44
0.04%		4 345
3.78%
Proofpoint843
6.72%		691
5.51%		744
5.93%		463
3.69%		344
2.74%		469
3.74%		481
3.83%		1 103
8.79%		1
0.01%		241
1.92%
Cloudflare Email Routing262
2.20%		79
0.66%		65
0.55%		33
0.28%		120
1.01%		11
0.09%		22
0.18%		6
0.05%		11 646
97.84%		102
0.86%
Yandex 360155
1.37%		35
0.31%		32
0.28%		70
0.62%		219
1.94%		2
0.02%		68
0.60%		1
0.01%		6
0.05%		27
0.24%
Mimecast1 006
10.12%		1 033
10.39%		756
7.60%		677
6.81%		527
5.30%		805
8.10%		636
6.40%		1 161
11.68%		1
0.01%		201
2.02%
Hostinger40
0.53%		40
0.53%		9
0.12%		7
0.09%		62
0.82%		4
0.05%		5
0.07%		0
0.00%		6
0.08%		26
0.34%
Namecheap Email Forwarding11
0.16%		10
0.14%		4
0.06%		2
0.03%		18
0.26%		0
0.00%		7
0.10%		0
0.00%		4
0.06%		10
0.14%
Zoho Mail412
5.94%		174
2.51%		95
1.37%		113
1.63%		311
4.48%		20
0.29%		99
1.43%		2
0.03%		44
0.63%		106
1.53%

Reverse DNS of inbound MX addresses

PTR is measured separately from the OpenINTEL snapshot. These addresses receive mail; they do not identify the actual sending IP. Forward-confirmed reverse DNS, outbound use and delivery are not measured here.

Last stored DNS attempt: 2026-09-24 08:07:24 UTC. Complete current observations: 238 472 of 381 440 MX hostnames in this snapshot. The freshness window is 14 days; this is not a daily check of every MX.

15 647 of 238 472 completely measured MX hosts returned negative PTR answers for every address. A partial check of the first few addresses cannot establish that result.

No PTR by mailbox provider

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
Self-Hosted140 5327.23% (10 162)
Google Workspace123 0750.00% (0)
Unknown / Other38 5674.74% (1 827)
Generic / unmatched (mx*.*)14 8544.92% (731)
Proofpoint12 0610.00% (0)
Generic / unmatched (mail.*)12 0229.72% (1 169)
Yandex 36011 2240.00% (0)
Hostinger7 55299.43% (7 509)
Namecheap Email Forwarding7 0020.00% (0)
Zoho Mail6 9110.00% (0)
QQ Mail (Tencent)5 64899.86% (5 640)
OVH Mail5 0690.02% (1)

No PTR by list position

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
top_1k4886.97% (34)
top_10k4 4974.51% (203)
top_100k44 2315.79% (2 561)
top_1m416 6397.21% (30 019)
unranked5 1869.27% (481)

No PTR by ccTLD

GroupComplete measured domainsAll MX addresses without PTR
cn3 99169.01% (2 754)
kr2 62428.47% (747)
in6 10214.11% (861)
pk98312.82% (126)
cc1 01611.42% (116)
ir2 13511.38% (243)
kz95010.42% (99)
hk54010.37% (56)
lt6639.50% (63)
id2 6158.37% (219)

55.85% of 140 532 completely measured self-hosted domains have observed PTR names entirely outside the study domain. This is a relationship between names, not a DNS-zone or FCrDNS test.

30 974 observed IPs are associated with 2–100 current MX hostnames. This does not identify shared sending reputation.

Stale: 2 279; legacy results without per-address outcomes: 839; not cached: 2 902; partial address coverage: 121 287. These categories can overlap. Incomplete and unknown domains are excluded from percentages.

Next check: obtain the actual sending IP, query its PTR records, then resolve those names to A/AAAA and compare the IPs. A PTR name outside this domain alone does not establish a configuration failure.

Top 100 most-used DMARC records (verbatim)

The literal record string copied verbatim from DNS — useful to spot copy-pasted "starter" policies and identify reporting endpoints (the rua= / ruf= tags) shared across many domains.

#DMARC recordDomains
1v=DMARC1; p=none;59 841
2v=DMARC1; p=none32 821
3v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com9 457
4v=DMARC1; p=quarantine;5 190
5v=DMARC1; p=reject;4 221
6v=DMARC1; p=quarantine4 177
7v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;4 037
8v=DMARC1;p=none;3 579
9v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s3 139
10v=DMARC1; p=reject3 080
11v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com3 020
12v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r;2 527
13v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=1002 216
14v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;2 210
15v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; ruf=mailto:dmarc@mailinblue.com!10m; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=864001 969
16v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; sp=none1 839
17v=DMARC1;p=none1 826
18v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r;1 605
19v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;1 577
20v=DMARC1;p=reject;1 410
21v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 292
22v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email1 253
23v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=864001 173
24v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;pct=100;fo=11 166
25v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none;1 144
Show rows 26 – 100
#DMARC recordDomains
26v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none1 133
27v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;930
28v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com; ruf=mailto:report@dmarc.amazon.com903
29v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=r; aspf=r; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;860
30v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s845
31v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com830
32v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email755
33v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100746
34v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100745
35v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com712
36v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net; adkim=r; aspf=r;689
37v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400669
38v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; ruf=mailto:dmarc@qiye.163.com; rua=mailto:dmarc_report@qiye.163.com649
39v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com619
40v=DMARC1;p=quarantine575
41v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100;560
42v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400541
43v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;516
44v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@qq.com491
45v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_agg@vali.email;474
46v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100;462
47v=DMARC1; p=none; adkim=r; aspf=r440
48v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; adkim=r; aspf=r424
49v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s404
50v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s;381
51v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100;368
52v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; fo=1344
53v=DMARC1;p=reject343
54v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r335
55v=DMARC1; p=reject; adkim=s; aspf=s329
56v=DMARC1; p=none; aspf=r; adkim=r326
57v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;321
58v=DMARC1;p=quarantine;320
59v=DMARC1319
60v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=none; rf=afrf; pct=100; ri=86400304
61v=DMARC1; p=none; fo=1303
62v=DMARC1;p=reject;fo=1;rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com301
63v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject; pct=100; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com; ruf=mailto:dmarcrecord@gmail.com;296
64v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com294
65v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;pct=50;adkim=r;aspf=r;282
66v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zsrbf6su@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com;276
67v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:mailauth-reports@google.com272
68v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:tnoff9hr@ag.eu.dmarcadvisor.com; aspf=s; adkim=s;268
69v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400261
70v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; ruf=mailto:dmarc@smtp.mailtrap.live; rf=afrf; pct=100256
71v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;fo=1246
72v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=s; aspf=s;241
73v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:dmarc_report@service.aliyun.com232
74v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com232
75v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@reporting.unisender.com230
76v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:rua-mpse@mpub.ne.jp222
77v=DMARC1; p=none; sp=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-raports@dhosting.pl218
78v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc.rua@edrone.app; ruf=mailto:dmarc.ruf@edrone.app215
79v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject207
80v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:zicaptxt@ag.dmarcian.com;200
81v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com200
82v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com;196
83v=DMARC1; p=reject; fo=1; ri=3600; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@emaildefense.proofpoint.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc_ruf@emaildefense.proofpoint.com195
84v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:dmarc_rua@onsecureserver.net;191
85v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; adkim=r; aspf=r189
86v=DMARC1;p=none;rua=mailto:rua@dmarc.brevo.com189
87v=DMARC1; p=reject; ruf=mailto:dmarc@purelymail.com187
88v=DMARC1; p=reject; sp=reject;185
89v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; adkim=r; aspf=r;183
90v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=100; rua=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@ag.eu.dmarcly.com; ruf=mailto:61e7fc8674b33@fo.eu.dmarcly.com; sp=quarantine; fo=1;177
91v=DMARC1;p=reject;pct=100;174
92v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; fo=1171
93v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100170
94v=DMARC1;p=none;sp=none;adkim=r;aspf=r;pct=100163
95v=DMARC1; p=none; pct=100; rua=mailto:dmarc@fbl.optin.com;163
96v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=100; adkim=s; aspf=s162
97v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; sp=quarantine159
98v=DMARC1;p=none;pct=100;aspf=r;adkim=r;155
99v=DMARC1;p=reject;sp=reject;adkim=s;aspf=s;pct=100;fo=0;rf=afrf;ri=86400155
100v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc-report@cv-library.co.uk; ruf=mailto:dmarc-report@cv-library.co.uk; fo=0; adkim=r; aspf=r; pct=0; rf=afrf; ri=86400; sp=none155
From DNS policy to a real message. A published policy cannot tell you where a particular email lands. Run an inbox placement test: send a real message to our seed mailboxes at Gmail, Outlook, Yandex and Mail.ru and see where it lands — inbox, spam, or nowhere.
Test your deliverability →

Unmatched MX targets — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular MX hostnames our dictionary does not yet attribute to a named mailbox provider. Public list — these feed back into dictionaries/mx_providers.py for the next iteration so coverage keeps improving.

#MX targetDomains
1mail.levikof.com810
2localhost539
3mail240
4mail.parktons.com180
5mail1.sbnation.com166
6ms06.cv-library.co.uk157
7ms07.cv-library.co.uk157
8ms08.cv-library.co.uk157
9mail2.recop.jp156
10ns4.forevermail.com154
11alltheemails.com150
12mail.autoline.com.ua139
13mx2.z-ns.net138
14mx.email-messaging.com133
15mail.pickelhost.com132
16lbmx.bcc.gov.bd127
17entrap-01.hostns.io120
18entrap-02.hostns.io120
19entrap-03.hostns.io120
20s.mail.dcsaas.net120
21mxi.alpha-prm.jp117
22mx1d10.thinline.cz114
23mx1b20.thinline.cz114
24mx1.ticketsinbound.com113
25mx2.ticketsinbound.com110
Show rows 26 – 100
#MX targetDomains
26mail.mpcloud.net109
27mx-backup.serveriai.lt105
28~102
29mx.maxns.net98
30mx2.netim.net89
31mx1.netim.net88
32amazon-smtp.amazon.com87
33mailgw01.host.it86
34mail-fr.securemail.pro86
35mx.vshosting.eu86
36mailgw02.host.it84
37cloudmail.auto-vision.ru83
38mx-01.mail-forwarder.io83
39mx6.kvnbw.de83
40mx7.kvnbw.de83
41mx8.kvnbw.de83
42mx9.kvnbw.de83
43mail.vipmailservice.com82
44mx1-dk.centerasecurity.dk81
45mx2-dk.centerasecurity.dk81
46mx-02.mail-forwarder.io81
47email.webglobe.cz80
48email2.webglobe.cz80
49mailforward.dnsv.jp79
50email3.webglobe.cz79
51email4.webglobe.cz79
52mx3-dk.centerasecurity.dk75
53mx1.email-cluster.com75
54mx2.email-cluster.com74
55mx.aams4.jp73
56failover1.email-cluster.com72
57void.blackhole.mx70
58mx-0.aams4.jp70
59mx-1.aams4.jp70
60mail.global.frontbridge.com70
61mail.bluetie.com69
62posta.mediacenter.hu69
63posta2.mediacenter.hu69
64posta4.mediacenter.hu69
65posta5.mediacenter.hu69
66q01es.mail.s-web.de69
67q02es.mail.s-web.de69
68r01es.mail.s-web.de69
69r02es.mail.s-web.de69
70posta3.mediacenter.hu68
71gmail22.gadmail.de68
72gmail23.gadmail.de68
73wmail22.gadmail.de68
74mta.vshosting.eu67
75mxa.expediagroup.com67
76mxb.expediagroup.com67
77wmail23.gadmail.de67
78mx1.alwaysdata.com66
79mx2.alwaysdata.com66
80mx4.emailowl.com65
81mx.sendcloud.org64
82smtp.faisco.cn64
83mx01.statens-it.dk64
84mx02.statens-it.dk64
85mx03.statens-it.dk64
86mx04.statens-it.dk64
87mx05.statens-it.dk64
88mx06.statens-it.dk64
89mx07.statens-it.dk64
90mx08.statens-it.dk64
91rmail22.gadmail.de64
92rmail23.gadmail.de64
93mx5.emailowl.com63
94omail22.gadmail.de63
95omail23.gadmail.de63
96mx.spamfilter.io62
97mx6.emailowl.com62
98mx1.simplelogin.co62
99mx2.simplelogin.co62
100smtp-avas.seeweb.it62

Unmatched SPF includes — top 100

What this block shows. The most popular SPF include: targets that don't match any known ESP, mailbox-as-sender, or SaaS pattern yet. Same feedback loop: top hits get added to dictionaries/esps.py or dictionaries/saas_senders.py.

#SPF includeDomains
1_spf.abcp.ru171
2_spf.cv-library.co.uk157
3_spf1-aws.recop.jp157
4_spf.mail-neoserv.si152
5yunyou.top141
6_spf.lh.pl140
7spf.mailii.org123
8_spf.edhost.eu122
9spf.mailcamp.nl118
10spf.pitcom.net113
11spf.w4ymail.at111
12spf.host-ww.net110
13_spf.exsilia.net109
14spf.cesky-hosting.cz107
15spf.spcloud.jp107
16_spf.armada.it106
17spf.emailfilter.io106
18spf.boldem.cz106
19spf-2248456.jmsend.com104
20spf.betrend.com104
21_spf.wpopt.net104
22smtp-cluster.plusvps.com104
23relay.guzelhosting.com102
24mfg.siteprotect.com100
25_spf.yourfilter.nl100
Show rows 26 – 100
#SPF includeDomains
26_spf.sendnode.com99
27mlrcloud.com99
28spf.satorimail.net98
29spf.host.it98
30_spf.academicworks.com98
31spf.symplicity.com97
32_pmta2.antevenio.com97
33spf.protection.outlook97
34mailing.eqs.com97
35amazon.com97
36_spf.localservices.com.br97
37spf.form.run96
38_spf.presscloud.com96
39spf.aams4.jp96
40mailii.org96
41spf.v6send.net96
42_spf.tld-mx.com95
43spf.mijndomeinhosting.nl95
44_spf.octadesk.com95
45fmx.etius.jp95
46verifymyfafsa.com94
47mailmailmail.net93
48spf.esvacloud.com93
49spf.postbox.yandexcloud.net93
50relay.thundermail.uk93
51spf.protect.kvnbw.de92
52spf.qboxmail.com92
53_spf.aid.no92
54spf.ssmx.net91
55send.k-crm.jp91
56spf-us.appmail.granicusgovaccess.net91
57_spf.sent2email.com91
58ofsys.com90
59_spf.simpleviewinc.com90
60_spf.goskope.com89
61_spf01.mykronos.com89
62spf.qb-feedback.com88
63limajo.witglobal.net88
64spf.w2solution.com88
65relay.email-cluster.com88
66_spf.eemsg.mail.mil88
67_spf.shared-server.net88
68spf.rpost.net87
69sender.zcsend.jp87
70woexchange.com87
71eversrv.com86
72spf.redpoints.com86
73spf.shopserve.jp86
74spf2.nlk2.smtps.jp86
75spf.sosafe.de85
76_spf.herodesk-mails.io85
77spf.gansend.com85
78spf.chinaemail.cn85
79spfref.jackhenry.com84
80_spf.newsautodoc.com83
81spf.zoner.fi83
82custmail.vdata.com83
83dospf.simplepart.com83
84spf82
85ciphr247.com82
86_spf.zorgmail.nl82
87_spf-c.arukereso.hu82
88email.nimbleams.com81
89spf.263xmail.com81
90spfv.global-mail.cn81
91senders.mailmasterplus.net81
92spf.sabre.com80
93universalspf.org80
94x.universalspf.org80
95eur.pb-dynmktge.com80
96no-ip.com80
97spf.filteredmx.net80
98mail.imismailcenter.com80
99spf.hostido.pl79
100gateways.firstdata.com79

Methodology — how the numbers were produced

1. Data source

The dataset is the daily OpenINTEL forward-DNS Tranco snapshot (University of Twente / SURFnet / SIDN Labs). OpenINTEL queries the entire Tranco top-1M domain list daily for MX, TXT, NS, A, AAAA, SOA, CAA, DNSSEC and other records, publishing the results as Apache Parquet. For pre-2022 history we additionally use OpenINTEL's alexa source (the legacy Alexa top-1M list, retired 2023).

Cite: Roland van Rijswijk-Deij et al., "A High-Performance, Scalable Infrastructure for Large-Scale Active DNS Measurements", IEEE JSAC 2016.

1b. Where the rest of the analysis lives

Six deep-dive pages are rebuilt by the same daily run and were previously reachable only through the sitemap: SPF health (final all qualifier, DNS-lookup limit, record length) · Email security posture (MTA-STS, BIMI, TLS-RPT, DKIM selectors) · SaaS via verification tokens · DNS/NS providers · Country × ESP · Infrastructure & TLS.

2. Sample & cadence

Each report covers a single date — OpenINTEL publishes snapshot D on D+1, so the current UTC date is never treated as an expected snapshot. Freshness means matching the latest date actually present in the OpenINTEL catalogue, typically ~700 k domains with MX records and ~620 k with SPF. The pipeline runs daily at 03:00 UTC, after the usual source-publication window; each daily run produces an HTML report, a JSON summary, an updated time-series, and incremental updates to the domain registry (§ 12). No sub-sampling.

3. Mailbox provider classification

For each domain we read its MX RRset and pick the record with the lowest mx_preference as the primary mailbox host. The hostname of that primary MX is matched against an open regex dictionary (dictionaries/mx_providers.py, currently 330 patterns, hash below). Specific patterns (e.g. .mail.protection.outlook.com) are tried first; generic fallbacks (mail.*, mx*.*) only after. Domains whose MX matches no rule are kept as "Unknown / Other" — never dropped — and exported in Unmatched MX targets for dictionary improvement.

4. ESP / SaaS / forwarder / gateway classification (SPF-based)

For each domain's apex SPF record (TXT starting with v=spf1) we extract every include: and redirect= target and resolve them against open classification dictionaries (ESPs, mailbox-as-sender, anti-spam gateways, forwarders, SaaS senders, DMARC vendors, NS providers, verification tokens).

Resolution order: PURE_ESP → MAILBOX_AS_SENDER → GATEWAYS → FORWARDERS → bare-apex substring fallback → SAAS_SENDERS substring iteration. Bare-apex derivation strips leading _spf., _spf-eu., spf., mail. prefixes from dict keys to catch subdomain variants (e.g. _spf.m1.websupport.sk → matches websupport.sk). Malformed includes (no dot, <4 chars) are filtered.

One domain may use several ESPs simultaneously, so ESP shares sum to more than 100% of SPF-publishing domains. Current SPF-include target coverage: 82.31%, recomputed from this snapshot rather than hard-coded.

Limitation: "flattened" SPF (where include chains were replaced with raw IP ranges to fit the 10-lookup limit) is not detectable from DNS alone — those domains appear ESP-less even when an ESP is in fact used.

5. DMARC (deep)

For each domain we query the _dmarc.<domain> TXT record. Records starting with v=DMARC1 are parsed for:

  • p= (apex policy): none / quarantine / reject / invalid
  • sp= (subdomain policy)
  • pct= (rollout percentage)
  • rua= aggregate-report destinations → classified into vendor buckets (Postmark DMARC, Valimail, dmarcian, URIports, EasyDMARC, Red Sift, Proofpoint EFD, Agari/Fortra, …) using dictionaries/dmarc_vendors.py

A domain is counted as enforced if p=quarantine or p=reject with pct=100 (or pct absent — defaults to 100).

6. SPF mechanics & health

For every SPF record we additionally extract:

  • Final qualifier on the all mechanism: -all (hard fail), ~all (soft fail), ?all (neutral), +all (pass-everything — broken / dangerous), or missing
  • DNS lookup count (include:, redirect=, a:, mx:, exists:, ptr:) — each mechanism counts as 1 against the spec limit of 10. Records exceeding the limit return PermErr at recipients
  • Mechanism mix: include-only (modern), raw IP4/IP6 ranges only (legacy/flattened), mixed
  • Record byte length: percentiles to flag fragmentation risk (>450 B)

7. Email security maturity

Adoption of modern mail-security TXT records, parsed from the same OpenINTEL parquet:

  • MTA-STS: TXT at _mta-sts.<domain> with v=STSv1 — domain advertises required-TLS to its MX
  • BIMI: TXT at default._bimi.<domain> with v=BIMI1 — brand publishes a verified logo (requires p=reject)
  • TLS-RPT (SMTP TLS Reporting): TXT at _smtp._tls.<domain> with v=TLSRPTv1 — domain monitors TLS-failure reports
  • DKIM selectors: where the OpenINTEL scan includes *._domainkey.<domain> queries, well-known selectors (google, selector1/2, s1/s2, k1/k2/k3, mailo, mte1, …) are mapped to issuing ESPs

8. DNS provider classification

For each domain's NS RRset, every NS hostname is matched against a suffix dictionary (dictionaries/ns_providers.py) with patterns for Cloudflare, AWS Route 53, Azure DNS, Google Cloud DNS, GoDaddy, Akamai, NS1, UltraDNS, Yandex, DNSPod, Aliyun, OVH, Hetzner, Gandi, registrars, and others. A domain is assigned to its dominant NS provider; ties resolve to whichever pattern was matched first.

9. SaaS-via-verification-tokens

Many SaaS apps a domain is connected to never appear in SPF (because the SaaS doesn't send mail FROM the customer domain). To recover this signal we parse apex TXT records for verification tokens — google-site-verification=…, MS=…, atlassian-domain-verification=…, stripe-verification=…, plus 149 other patterns in dictionaries/verification_tokens.py. This produces a complementary "SaaS density" metric and surfaces apps that the SPF-only view misses.

10. Email infrastructure modernity

Three additional TLS / IPv6 metrics:

  • IPv6-on-MX: MX hostname has at least one AAAA record
  • DANE / TLSA on MX: TLSA record at _25._tcp.<mx_host> (where the parquet includes TLSA queries)
  • CAA: any 0 issue … / 0 issuewild … record at apex; CAs aggregated into a market-share view (Let's Encrypt, DigiCert, Sectigo, …)

11. Cross-tabulations

  • Country × ESP heatmap: top-15 ccTLDs × top-15 ESPs, cell = % of country's SPF-publishing domains using ESP X. Surfaces regional ESP champions (Brevo / FR, Unisender / RU, MailerLite / LT, Akna / BR, Shoptet / CZ).
  • Mailbox × ESP combinations: stacked frequency of common stack pairings — published as Mailbox provider × sending platform.

12. Domain registry & identifiers

Every domain ever observed across snapshots is assigned a stable integer ID in /var/openintel-cache/registry/domains.sqlite3 (currently 1 996 849 domains). Reports reference domains by ID rather than embedding strings; clients resolve names from a single gzipped registry dump (/email-stats/domains.csv.gz, 26.1 MB). This keeps per-report payloads compact, enables fast set-operation diffs across snapshots, and gives every domain a first-seen / last-seen timestamp.

13. Daily change-alerts feed

Each daily run computes a domain-level diff vs the previous scan and emits a change-feed at /email-stats/alerts.html (also as JSON + Atom). Detected events: ESP added/removed in SPF, DMARC policy upgrade/downgrade, primary-mailbox-provider change, SPF strict→soft regression, MTA-STS / BIMI first publication. Severity tag is good / bad / info.

14. Per-entity detail pages

The top-100 ESPs, top-100 SaaS senders and top-80 mailbox providers each have a dedicated detail page at /email-stats/detail/<kind>/<slug>.html showing KPI cards, a Chart.js sparkline (from history.json), TLD distribution and a sample of customer domains.

15. Tier breakdown

Each domain is assigned a tier from its Tranco rank: top-1k / top-10k / top-100k / top-1M, plus unranked for domains measured in the snapshot but absent from the current list file (rotation). Published as Authentication by Tranco tier: SPF, DMARC enforcement and self-hosting per tier.

16. Reproducibility & data hygiene

Dictionary hashes for this run (sha256, first 12 hex):

  • compliance.py — 76d502287abe
  • dmarc_vendors.py — 8c195eb564fc
  • domain_match.py — 8411162f72b7
  • esps.py — 206a79aab417
  • mx_providers.py — 23fb265346a7
  • mx_selection.py — 8e9445ccc3e3
  • ns_providers.py — cc4f43c6651f
  • providers_meta.py — 8222adcb331d
  • saas_meta.py — 10901ef58846
  • saas_senders.py — 9ffa69056163
  • tld_regions.py — 61e8bd3dcca8
  • verification_tokens.py — 6ba8313e55ab

Every published report includes the exact OpenINTEL date, dictionary file hashes, and counts of unmatched MX hosts and SPF includes — so any reader can verify or reproduce the figures. Raw OpenINTEL parquet is downloaded into a temporary cache and deleted after analysis; only aggregated, non-redistributable counts are kept long-term (per OpenINTEL data agreement). The domain registry stores names but no record-level content.

16b. Methodology changelog

Every change to a metric definition is recorded in the methodology changelog and stamped into each history point as methodology_version — so a step in a series can always be attributed to a formula change rather than to reality.

17. Limitations to be aware of

  • Tranco bias. Top-1M skews toward US/EU and global SaaS; ccTLD-only domains with low traffic may be under-represented. The alexa source used for pre-2022 history has a different composition and a different size: the alexa partition of 2022-04-01 contains 1 637 544 measured apex names against 1 087 498 in tranco on 2026-07-24, so absolute counts are not comparable across the 2022-08-11 boundary — only shares within a snapshot are.
  • SPF flattening hides ESP identity (see § 4).
  • CNAME chains on MX (e.g. mail.example.com → mail.example.protection.outlook.com) are not unrolled — only the first MX target is matched. This biases a small share of domains toward "Unknown" when their MX is a CNAME to a known provider.
  • Vanity MX with white-label provider (Mimecast/Proofpoint customers using their own brand) is not detectable from DNS alone.
  • DKIM enumeration is selector-based — only domains whose well-known selectors are scanned by OpenINTEL appear in the DKIM layer.
  • Long-tail unmatched: this snapshot contains 83 105 unique unclassified SPF targets. The count is published as a measured coverage KPI rather than a fixed estimate; many are regional hosters, tenant-specific endpoints, malformed records, or single-domain infrastructure.
  • Newly-added dictionary entries have no historical sparkline until ≥ 2 daily scans accumulate, since archived raw parquet is purged after parsing per the OpenINTEL data agreement.

Comments & corrections

Spotted a mis-classified MX target, missed ESP, or want to discuss a finding? We publish corrections in the next daily snapshot.

Send feedback to support@live-direct-marketing.online

Inline comments coming soon. For now, email is the fastest path — you'll see your fix reflected in tomorrow's run.

For press and analysts

What this block shows. The dataset is rebuilt every day and published under CC BY 4.0 — use the numbers, the charts and the PDF in your material, with a link back. If you need a cut that is not on this page, ask: we run it against the same snapshot and send it over.

Download the report (PDF) Headline numbers, charts and methodology in one file, rebuilt daily. Press kitCharts as PNG and WebP, ready to publish, with captions. Machine-readableJSON API, full time series, CSV exports, Atom change feed. Licence & citationCC BY 4.0, ready-made citation and BibTeX.
Need a custom cut? A single country, a single provider, a longer period, a comparison against your own list — we prepare it from the same daily snapshot and send the numbers with the date attached. No charge for editorial use.
Request data

Historical reports

Daily snapshots — last 90 days kept fully, older ones thinned to one point per month. Points marked partial are incomplete days at the source and are excluded from deltas and trends.

219 snapshots since 2016-01-22 — open the list
2026-09-24 — 675 489 MX, 637 420 SPF2026-09-22 — 675 663 MX, 637 585 SPF2026-09-21 — 676 104 MX, 638 081 SPF2026-09-20 — 676 114 MX, 638 158 SPF2026-09-19 — 680 914 MX, 642 799 SPF2026-09-18 — 675 783 MX, 637 944 SPF2026-09-17 — 673 136 MX, 635 547 SPF2026-09-16 — 672 143 MX, 634 905 SPF2026-09-14 — 674 487 MX, 637 677 SPF2026-09-13 — 664 797 MX, 628 913 SPF2026-09-12 — 665 310 MX, 629 828 SPF2026-09-11 — 666 213 MX, 631 089 SPF2026-09-10 — 667 099 MX, 632 322 SPF2026-09-09 — 667 415 MX, 633 115 SPF2026-09-08 — 667 494 MX, 633 491 SPF2026-09-07 — 666 076 MX, 632 414 SPF2026-09-06 — 665 504 MX, 631 995 SPF2026-09-05 — 666 937 MX, 633 359 SPF2026-09-04 — 676 554 MX, 642 190 SPF2026-09-03 — 675 596 MX, 641 147 SPF2026-09-02 — 674 627 MX, 639 932 SPF2026-09-01 — 674 958 MX, 640 343 SPF2026-08-31 — 679 421 MX, 644 387 SPF2026-08-30 — 680 695 MX, 645 473 SPF2026-08-29 — 618 823 MX, 587 379 SPF partial2026-08-28 — 677 171 MX, 642 062 SPF2026-08-27 — 677 157 MX, 641 959 SPF2026-08-26 — 677 089 MX, 641 830 SPF2026-08-25 — 677 219 MX, 641 893 SPF2026-08-24 — 676 834 MX, 641 489 SPF2026-08-23 — 676 669 MX, 641 394 SPF2026-08-22 — 676 355 MX, 641 125 SPF2026-08-21 — 681 191 MX, 645 688 SPF2026-08-20 — 674 470 MX, 639 419 SPF2026-08-19 — 672 105 MX, 637 085 SPF2026-08-18 — 671 693 MX, 636 741 SPF2026-08-17 — 671 752 MX, 636 637 SPF2026-08-16 — 674 092 MX, 638 721 SPF2026-08-14 — 663 240 MX, 628 485 SPF2026-08-13 — 663 264 MX, 628 572 SPF2026-08-12 — 663 252 MX, 628 407 SPF2026-08-11 — 662 761 MX, 627 932 SPF2026-08-10 — 662 160 MX, 627 184 SPF2026-08-09 — 661 672 MX, 626 624 SPF2026-08-08 — 670 439 MX, 634 892 SPF2026-08-07 — 670 484 MX, 634 873 SPF2026-08-06 — 668 231 MX, 632 544 SPF2026-08-05 — 680 832 MX, 644 102 SPF2026-08-04 — 664 122 MX, 628 339 SPF2026-08-02 — 664 010 MX, 628 104 SPF2026-08-01 — 667 030 MX, 630 925 SPF2026-07-31 — 667 040 MX, 630 769 SPF2026-07-30 — 667 152 MX, 630 662 SPF2026-07-29 — 666 778 MX, 630 142 SPF2026-07-28 — 666 803 MX, 630 030 SPF2026-07-27 — 666 750 MX, 629 781 SPF2026-07-26 — 667 887 MX, 630 738 SPF2026-07-25 — 671 693 MX, 634 220 SPF2026-07-24 — 668 195 MX, 626 838 SPF2026-07-23 — 668 612 MX, 627 156 SPF2026-07-22 — 667 580 MX, 626 173 SPF2026-07-21 — 667 464 MX, 626 022 SPF2026-07-20 — 668 961 MX, 627 463 SPF2026-07-19 — 659 183 MX, 618 199 SPF2026-07-18 — 659 259 MX, 618 271 SPF2026-07-17 — 659 253 MX, 618 231 SPF2026-07-16 — 659 459 MX, 618 470 SPF2026-07-15 — 659 420 MX, 618 461 SPF2026-07-14 — 659 112 MX, 618 197 SPF2026-07-13 — 658 711 MX, 617 702 SPF2026-07-12 — 658 108 MX, 617 244 SPF2026-07-11 — 657 701 MX, 616 967 SPF2026-07-10 — 657 207 MX, 616 333 SPF2026-07-09 — 657 304 MX, 616 494 SPF2026-07-08 — 656 808 MX, 615 969 SPF2026-07-07 — 655 988 MX, 615 231 SPF2026-07-06 — 655 261 MX, 614 575 SPF2026-07-05 — 654 926 MX, 614 272 SPF2026-07-04 — 665 047 MX, 623 765 SPF2026-07-03 — 664 686 MX, 623 266 SPF2026-07-02 — 664 961 MX, 623 597 SPF2026-07-01 — 664 715 MX, 623 370 SPF2026-06-30 — 665 299 MX, 624 066 SPF2026-06-29 — 671 597 MX, 630 016 SPF2026-06-28 — 667 370 MX, 626 001 SPF2026-06-27 — 666 220 MX, 624 986 SPF2026-06-25 — 665 951 MX, 624 772 SPF2026-06-22 — 665 950 MX, 625 047 SPF2026-06-15 — 662 137 MX, 623 017 SPF2026-06-08 — 650 013 MX, 611 648 SPF2026-06-01 — 662 428 MX, 622 222 SPF2026-05-18 — 653 826 MX, 613 816 SPF2026-05-11 — 654 275 MX, 614 529 SPF2026-05-04 — 662 839 MX, 622 414 SPF2026-04-30 — 665 325 MX, 624 448 SPF2026-04-27 — 665 219 MX, 624 507 SPF2026-03-01 — 683 543 MX, 639 798 SPF2026-02-01 — 688 114 MX, 641 985 SPF2026-01-01 — 660 114 MX, 616 352 SPF2025-12-01 — 668 692 MX, 622 313 SPF2025-11-01 — 659 524 MX, 613 922 SPF2025-10-01 — 644 366 MX, 599 103 SPF2025-09-01 — 685 366 MX, 635 390 SPF2025-08-01 — 681 988 MX, 632 521 SPF2025-07-01 — 687 700 MX, 638 068 SPF2025-06-01 — 699 879 MX, 648 954 SPF2025-05-01 — 711 257 MX, 659 028 SPF2025-04-01 — 702 306 MX, 651 786 SPF2025-03-01 — 705 611 MX, 653 173 SPF2025-02-01 — 696 358 MX, 644 666 SPF2025-01-01 — 674 214 MX, 626 064 SPF2024-12-01 — 675 247 MX, 626 465 SPF2024-11-01 — 669 912 MX, 614 354 SPF2024-10-01 — 659 879 MX, 603 315 SPF2024-09-01 — 660 693 MX, 604 347 SPF2024-08-01 — 639 733 MX, 586 007 SPF2024-07-02 — 632 526 MX, 578 066 SPF2024-06-01 — 614 961 MX, 562 373 SPF2024-05-01 — 621 817 MX, 566 602 SPF2024-04-01 — 641 948 MX, 582 732 SPF2024-03-01 — 666 638 MX, 601 954 SPF2024-02-01 — 653 497 MX, 588 373 SPF2024-01-01 — 657 371 MX, 586 519 SPF2023-12-01 — 660 455 MX, 588 456 SPF2023-11-01 — 666 944 MX, 591 587 SPF2023-10-01 — 675 039 MX, 597 200 SPF2023-09-01 — 694 895 MX, 612 567 SPF2023-08-01 — 716 729 MX, 622 501 SPF2023-07-01 — 653 321 MX, 565 370 SPF2023-06-01 — 656 260 MX, 561 661 SPF2023-05-01 — 657 236 MX, 561 046 SPF2023-04-01 — 662 162 MX, 562 122 SPF2023-03-01 — 730 155 MX, 620 415 SPF2023-02-01 — 715 023 MX, 602 519 SPF2023-01-01 — 712 767 MX, 599 702 SPF2022-12-01 — 712 641 MX, 594 977 SPF2022-11-01 — 710 891 MX, 590 969 SPF2022-10-01 — 716 152 MX, 594 587 SPF2022-09-01 — 716 956 MX, 595 410 SPF2022-08-11 — 427 823 MX, 354 634 SPF partial2022-07-01 — 968 388 MX, 789 788 SPF alexa2022-06-01 — 1 026 911 MX, 833 170 SPF alexa2022-05-01 — 921 706 MX, 748 398 SPF alexa2022-04-01 — 1 217 939 MX, 976 244 SPF alexa2022-03-01 — 975 521 MX, 779 131 SPF alexa2022-02-01 — 569 414 MX, 464 224 SPF partial alexa2022-01-01 — 552 174 MX, 447 427 SPF partial alexa2021-12-01 — 786 477 MX, 631 833 SPF alexa2021-11-01 — 525 808 MX, 424 311 SPF partial alexa2021-10-01 — 794 460 MX, 633 349 SPF alexa2021-09-01 — 788 407 MX, 628 585 SPF alexa2021-08-01 — 619 384 MX, 493 457 SPF partial alexa2021-07-01 — 728 817 MX, 579 133 SPF alexa2021-06-01 — 660 453 MX, 523 956 SPF alexa2021-05-01 — 788 324 MX, 620 170 SPF alexa2021-04-01 — 792 560 MX, 621 808 SPF alexa2021-03-01 — 646 458 MX, 507 824 SPF alexa2021-02-01 — 430 383 MX, 339 425 SPF partial alexa2021-01-01 — 714 286 MX, 554 817 SPF alexa2020-12-01 — 814 029 MX, 629 118 SPF alexa2020-11-01 — 748 490 MX, 574 865 SPF alexa2020-10-01 — 618 268 MX, 476 027 SPF partial alexa2020-09-01 — 768 508 MX, 586 561 SPF alexa2020-08-01 — 754 330 MX, 572 036 SPF alexa2020-07-01 — 947 188 MX, 717 066 SPF alexa2020-06-01 — 703 956 MX, 531 244 SPF partial alexa2020-05-01 — 965 680 MX, 721 262 SPF alexa2020-04-01 — 859 917 MX, 639 926 SPF alexa2020-03-01 — 780 292 MX, 579 459 SPF alexa2020-02-01 — 947 773 MX, 696 310 SPF alexa2020-01-01 — 565 274 MX, 417 038 SPF partial alexa2019-12-01 — 826 277 MX, 600 095 SPF alexa2019-11-01 — 1 039 570 MX, 747 867 SPF alexa2019-10-01 — 966 667 MX, 692 386 SPF alexa2019-09-01 — 838 362 MX, 594 935 SPF partial alexa2019-08-01 — 1 162 343 MX, 819 141 SPF alexa2019-07-01 — 1 177 952 MX, 806 744 SPF alexa2019-06-01 — 1 205 558 MX, 822 402 SPF alexa2019-05-01 — 1 196 890 MX, 811 837 SPF alexa2019-04-01 — 1 120 142 MX, 752 449 SPF alexa2019-03-01 — 1 170 801 MX, 787 932 SPF alexa2019-02-01 — 1 202 345 MX, 799 255 SPF alexa2019-01-01 — 1 190 206 MX, 783 686 SPF alexa2018-12-01 — 1 196 068 MX, 792 282 SPF alexa2018-11-01 — 1 177 133 MX, 775 137 SPF alexa2018-10-01 — 1 140 868 MX, 743 256 SPF alexa2018-09-01 — 1 183 473 MX, 765 011 SPF alexa2018-08-01 — 1 194 344 MX, 772 448 SPF alexa2018-07-01 — 1 165 617 MX, 745 554 SPF alexa2018-06-01 — 1 193 038 MX, 753 513 SPF alexa2018-05-01 — 1 168 881 MX, 732 275 SPF alexa2018-04-01 — 1 174 598 MX, 730 483 SPF alexa2018-03-01 — 827 056 MX, 516 103 SPF partial alexa2018-02-01 — 1 195 663 MX, 725 044 SPF alexa2018-01-01 — 813 525 MX, 512 876 SPF alexa2017-12-01 — 818 419 MX, 513 903 SPF alexa2017-11-01 — 815 080 MX, 507 477 SPF alexa2017-10-01 — 823 380 MX, 508 173 SPF alexa2017-09-01 — 815 671 MX, 500 347 SPF alexa2017-08-01 — 829 376 MX, 505 516 SPF alexa2017-07-01 — 830 824 MX, 502 438 SPF alexa2017-06-01 — 828 635 MX, 497 007 SPF partial alexa2017-05-01 — 828 210 MX, 493 097 SPF alexa2017-04-01 — 828 454 MX, 490 217 SPF alexa2017-03-01 — 824 804 MX, 483 151 SPF alexa2017-02-01 — 839 476 MX, 482 733 SPF alexa2017-01-01 — 827 995 MX, 470 990 SPF alexa2016-12-01 — 825 158 MX, 467 480 SPF alexa2016-11-01 — 837 849 MX, 472 624 SPF alexa2016-10-01 — 838 377 MX, 469 807 SPF alexa2016-09-01 — 835 089 MX, 462 936 SPF alexa2016-08-01 — 848 095 MX, 469 528 SPF alexa2016-07-01 — 842 098 MX, 463 893 SPF alexa2016-06-01 — 848 829 MX, 462 786 SPF alexa2016-05-01 — 843 824 MX, 455 820 SPF alexa2016-04-01 — 843 843 MX, 449 460 SPF alexa2016-03-01 — 865 090 MX, 456 873 SPF alexa2016-02-01 — 862 585 MX, 450 683 SPF alexa2016-01-22 — 845 356 MX, 440 606 SPF alexa
Data source: https://openintel.nl/data/forward-dns/top-lists/
Generated automatically from OpenINTEL Tranco snapshot 2026-09-24. Aggregates only — raw OpenINTEL data is deleted after analysis per their data agreement.
Last build: 2026-09-25T09:59:13Z.